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I. INTRODUCTION 
What if restrictive procedural rules operated in such a way that 
Alan Bakke, Jane Monell, and Ann Hopkins never got a chance to 
have their cases heard on the merits?  In other words, imagine that 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
1
 Monell v. Deparment of So-
cial Services,
2
 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
3
 never made it past an ini-
tial motion to dismiss and on to the Supreme Court.
4
  What would 
that world look like? 
These cases were essentially the “first” in areas of law that we 
have come to take for granted—affirmative action, municipal liability, 
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Kahng, Jack Kirkwood, John Mitchell, Dean Spade, Thomas Antkowiak, Won Kidane, 
and Gillian Dutton for work-shopping this Article and providing me with continuous 
feedback and support.  I am grateful to the 2010 Law & Society Work-In-Progress ses-
sion, especially the incredible input and guidance of Christopher Whytock.  Finally, 
many thanks to Evelyn Emanuel for her tireless research assistance.  
 1 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down a medical school’s race-based admissions 
system, but holding that some consideration of race in school admissions may be 
constitutional). 
 2 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that municipalities can be held liable for consti-
tutional violations under § 1983). 
 3 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (characterizing employment decisions made for lawful 
and unlawful purposes as “mixed motive” cases and recognizing gender stereotyping 
as a mode of proving discrimination). 
 4 In a companion piece, What if?: A Study of Seminal Cases As if Decided in A 
Twombly/Iqbal Regime, 90 OR. L. REV. 1147 (2012), I examined the original com-
plaints in two of these cases, along with others, to consider whether those complaints 
would have survived in the current restrictive procedural regime.  I found that, in 
both cases, the question of whether the complaints would survive a motion to dismiss 
is a close call, but there is a strong argument that a judge could legitimately dismiss 
these complaints under Twombly and Iqbal.  Id. at 1158–63.   Further, I determined 
that many of these complaints could not have simply been amended to meet the cur-
rent pleading standards.  Id. at 1160, 1163.  The asymmetry in information between 
the parties would have meant that plaintiffs could not have garnered those now-
required facts.  Id.   
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and gender discrimination.  Yet, without these first cases, that legal 
landscape might never have developed, or in the very least, would 
have developed on a completely different trajectory.
5
  Moreover, be-
yond the law itself, the absence of these cases might have changed the 
role of lawyers within our civil justice system and altered the possibil-
ity of utilizing courts as a vehicle for social change.  Thus, regardless 
of what one might think about the merits of these cases, our collec-
tive legal consciousness would be impoverished if these plaintiffs had 
never had their paradigmatic day in court. 
That world—the one without the Bakkes, Monells, and Hopkins 
among us—is exactly where the civil justice system is heading.  Plain-
tiffs like these are simply vanishing, and restrictive procedural rules 
are largely to blame.  While in the early 20th century procedural rules 
were animated by a “liberal ethos,” today’s procedural regime is un-
deniably more restrictive.
6
  This shift is well-documented in the litera-
ture
7
 and has been referred to as a movement reflective of a “restric-
tive ethos.”
8
  The articulated reason for this move is that frivolous 
claims undermine the civil justice system.  They drain scarce judicial 
resources, and they force innocent defendants to settle, not because 
they are liable, but because they are worried about litigation costs.
9
  
Yet, the departure from a liberal procedural regime is not just a 
complex response to a complex world.  Were it only that, one might 
argue that the rules are maintaining their envisioned flexibility by 
adapting to an ever-changing litigation scene.  This is not the case, 
however, because restrictive changes to procedure do not have a neu-
tral effect.  Judges, Congress, and the rulemaking bodies
10
 responsible 
for procedural changes are making trade-offs, and those trade-offs 
are made based on value judgments.
11
  In other words, creating a sys-
 
 5 For instance, without Bakke, there would have been no Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (affirming the consideration of race, but not racial quotas, in admis-
sions systems).   
 6 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 7 See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010). 
 8 Id. at 354. 
 9 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 10 This Article will refer to rulemaking bodies generally, which includes the 
Standing Committee on the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Adviso-
ry Committee on the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure or, as it is also known, 
the Civil Rules Committee.   
 11 See generally Alan Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Function-
ing Civil Procedure System (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Libr
ary/Alan%20Morrison,%20The%20Necessity%20of%20Tradeoffs.pdf.  
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tem that allows for less frivolous claims to survive is a goal that comes 
with a price.  In this case, the price of a restrictive shift in procedural 
doctrine is that it marginalizes particular claims, and by extension, 
particular people. 
This Article is concerned with such “particular people.”  Who 
are the individuals who are most affected by the movement from a 
liberal to restrictive ethos?  Some commentators have used the term 
social “out-groups,” meaning individuals who are outside of the polit-
ical and social mainstream.
12
  While this is a useful and quick articula-
tion, a more developed definition of who these affected plaintiffs are 
has yet to emerge in the literature in a full-throated way.  This piece 
endeavors to fill that gap.  In order to effectively critique procedural 
doctrine, it is critical to know who is affected and how.  To put it 
simply, generalized notions of marginalization do not capture the 
people who are most affected by this change.  Thus, this Article pro-
poses a new way of thinking about this phenomenon by giving a 
name and description to the plaintiff who is most negatively impacted 
by the restrictive procedural shift—the vanishing plaintiff.
13
 
There are two basic factors that define the vanishing plaintiff: 
(1) her economic status and (2) her existence outside of social 
norms.  Where a plaintiff is uniquely economically disadvantaged 
such that she cannot afford effective representation, and/or where a 
plaintiff is outside of mainstream conceptions of gender, sexuality, 
race, and/or culture, she becomes a vanishing plaintiff.  This is be-
cause restrictive procedural rules uniquely marginalize a plaintiff with 
these characteristics.  She is unable to access the necessary legal re-
sources to overcome restrictive procedural barriers because of her 
low economic status.  She is also less able to communicate her legal 
narrative because of her status as “other.” 
 
 12 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 7, at 370 (using social out-groups to describe this 
group with reference to Eric K. Yamamoto’s terminology—minorities asserting mar-
ginal claims). 
 13 A seminal piece by Marc Galanter provides an apt context for the term “vanish-
ing” within the civil procedure literature.  Marc S. Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An 
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 459 (2004).  In his article, Galanter describes how the decline in civil trials in 
particular instances is the product of resource disparities between the parties.  Id.  
While he takes a broader view of litigation and how resource disparities affect trial 
rates, he does not focus specifically on how procedural changes may differently im-
pact particular kinds of plaintiffs.  See id.  Nonetheless, his focus on a phenomenon 
of the changes in litigation—and most notably the disappearance of an aspect of liti-
gation—is apropos to this Article and its focus on the disappearance of a certain type 
of plaintiff and her claims.   
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While these two factors are inherently fluid, they are useful in 
focusing the bodies responsible for constructing procedural doctrine 
on how particular procedural changes may impact vanishing plaintiffs 
differently.  Thus far, these institutions—the Court, Congress, and 
rulemaking bodies—have moved procedural doctrine toward a re-
strictive ethos without correctly evaluating and valuing the claims of 
vanishing plaintiffs.  Without knowing whose meritorious claims are 
lost, it is difficult to weigh whether the policy choice of restricting 
procedural rules is a good one.  We know that some meritorious liti-
gation is sacrificed in a restrictive procedural regime, so the question 
becomes whether those lost claims are unique.  If such lost claims 
were captured by successful litigation—meritorious litigation that 
could make it over restrictive procedural hurdles—then this might be 
a worthy trade-off.  In other words, if it were the case that more re-
strictive procedural rules resulted in less frivolous litigation, with only 
a slight loss in unique meritorious claims, a restrictive procedural re-
gime may make sense.  The number of frivolous suits would be mini-
mized, and there would be a broad benefit for the meritorious claims 
that survive.  If it were determined, however, that a restrictive proce-
dural regime filters out more meritorious claims than what is ulti-
mately beneficial to society—meaning that the claims being lost are 
unique and not otherwise captured by successful litigation—then 
there is more room to question a procedural regime that is guided by 
a restrictive ethos. 
The institutions creating procedural doctrine do not know the 
answers to these critical questions, and existing scholarship has yet to 
deeply explore them.  Yet, the identities of the individuals who are 
acutely affected by restrictive procedural doctrine, and who are argu-
ably losing the opportunity to air their meritorious grievances, have 
to be determined in order to reach an optimal procedural regime.  
Once the identities of those plaintiffs are revealed, the meritorious 
claims that are being lost are similarly identifiable.  With that 
knowledge, the policy decision regarding whether such meritorious 
claims are a worthy trade-off for greater efficiency in the system is a 
more clearly defined one. 
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the shift in procedural 
doctrine from liberal to restrictive and highlights the beneficiaries of 
this shift—corporations, government entities, and other organiza-
tions.  Part III describes the vanishing plaintiff in terms of her re-
source disparity and unique narrative challenges.  Part III closes with 
a discussion of why vanishing plaintiff claims matter.  It argues that 
such claims create path-breaking laws and that litigation by vanishing 
plaintiffs is often the only effective mode of enforcement.  Finally, 
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Part IV applies two restrictive procedural changes—pleading and 
summary judgment—to the vanishing plaintiff and demonstrates how 
the vanishing plaintiff distinctly suffers.
14
  After considering these two 
examples, the Article concludes that when making procedural 
changes, Congress, the Court, and rulemaking bodies must fully ac-
count for the effect of such changes on vanishing plaintiffs.  This ac-
count will often require a retreat from the trend toward a restrictive 
procedural regime. 
II. THE RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURAL REGIME 
A. The Shift from a Liberal to Restrictive Procedural Regime 
Professor Richard Marcus first coined the term “liberal ethos” as 
a way to define the original rulemakers’ fundamental approach to 
procedural doctrine.
15
  He defined the liberal ethos as “a procedural 
system . . . in which the preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury 
trial, after full disclosure through discovery.”
16
  This ethos and the 
rules that flowed from it were in response to a procedural regime that 
had become bogged down in technicalities.
17
  The 1938 Civil Rules 
and the general judicial philosophy implementing them allowed the 
plaintiff to form her case in a logical and prudent fashion.
18
  She 
 
 14 In this Article, I rely on a range of paradigmatic cases to identify the vanishing 
plaintiff.  These case studies and empirical references help draw out features of the 
process that more traditional empirical analysis may not identify.  Moreover, this 
close study is necessary to move beyond imperial judicial analysis and inferences.  To 
discover who the vanishing plaintiff is, reliance on empirics alone is inadequate; thus, 
I use this mix of approaches to provide the full, complex picture.   
 15 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
adopted in 1938.  Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 465 (1993).  Their adoption was preceded by a forty-year-
long battle both for the merger of law and equity and for the creation of a uniform 
set of procedural rules.  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1035–98 (1982).  The battle began with an argument that “tech-
nicalities” in procedural doctrine, and not the merits of a case, dictated whether a 
case succeeded.  Id. at 1041–42; J. Newton Fiero, P.W. Meldrim & Francis B. James, 
Report of the Committee on Uniformity of Procedure, 21 A.B.A. REP. 454, 462 (1896).  In 
1905, Roscoe Pound’s famous “dissatisfaction speech” articulated these very con-
cerns.  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice, Address Delivered at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Associa-
tion (1906), reprinted in 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 55, 64, 65 (1962).  Pound argued 
that uniform federal rules—rules that would provide the flexibility necessary to reach 
the merits of a legal claim—should be adopted so that cases could be properly adju-
dicated.  Id.   
 16 Marcus, supra note 15, at 439. 
 17 Id. at 438–39.   
 18 See Spencer, supra note 7, at 355–56. 
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could discover facts, add claims, and join parties with great flexibil-
ity.
19
  Moreover, she was not called to “prove” her case until she was 
given due time to take all of these steps.
20
  Philosophically, the focus 
was on the merits of the case because the procedures were permitted 
to work in service of the merits.  In other words, the procedural rules 
were not viewed as tools for delay or for gamesmanship—they were 
tools for resolution of the substantive claim.
21
  
Even when the Civil Rules were adopted in 1938, there was con-
cern about abuse in the litigation system—abuse that would arise 
from too flexible a procedural regime.
22
  Ultimately, at the heart of 
this concern was the question of whether the liberality of the rules 
would allow frivolous claims to get through.
23
  And of course, the cor-
relative question was how to protect defendants from having to need-
 
 19 Charles Clark, former dean of Yale Law School and eventual federal judge, 
drafted rules implementing notice pleading and liberal joinder.  See CHARLES E. 
CLARK, PROCEDURE—THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE:  ESSAYS OF JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK 
43–68 (Charles Alan Wright & Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965).  Professor Edson R. 
Sunderland of the University of Michigan advocated for and created a flexible dis-
covery regime and a summary judgment rule.  See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expedi-
tions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
691, 710 (1998); Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pretrial Procedure, 36 
MICH. L. REV. 215, 216 (1937). 
 20 Spencer, supra note 7, at 355–56. 
 21 The liberal ethos reflected the goals of the committee responsible for drafting 
the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The committee was appointed pursuant to 
the Rules Enabling Act, which was adopted in 1934.  Pub. L. No. 73-413, 48 Stat. 1064 
(1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).  The Act provided for the 
merger of law and equity and empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate proce-
dural rules for the federal courts.  Id.  While there was debate about particular as-
pects of the rules themselves, there was little or no debate about their purpose.  See 
Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemak-
ing, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 265–74 (2009).  The committee members agreed that the 
rules should be flexible and give judges the necessary discretion to craft context-
specific solutions to myriad pre-litigation and litigation problems.  See CLARK, supra 
note 19, at 76 (explaining that the purpose of procedural rule reform was to “favor    
. . . less binding and strict rules of form . . . upon the litigants and their counsel”).  
Moreover, the committee members believed that uniformity among the federal 
courts was of great import.  Minutes of Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil Procedure 
90–105 (June 20, 1935), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR06-1935-
min.pdf.  Finally, as I have argued in a previous article, the committee members (as 
well as proponents of the Enabling Act legislation) believed that the rules should fa-
cilitate access to the federal court system.  See Coleman, supra.   
 22 For example, some committee members were quite skeptical of the liberal dis-
covery rules.  See generally Subrin, supra note 19, at 717–29.    
 23 For more on the characterization of cases as “frivolous,” see Suja Thomas, Friv-
olous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633 (2010). 
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lessly defend against frivolous claims.  It is at this tension point—the 
need to liberalize procedure to allow meritorious claims to survive 
versus the need to restrict procedure to filter out frivolous claims—
that the ethos around procedural doctrine shifts from liberal to re-
strictive. 
That shift has undoubtedly occurred as the current procedural 
doctrine is informed by a restrictive ethos.
24
  Scholars may debate 
whether such a move is a positive or negative one, but the fact re-
mains that much of the liberality of the procedural regime has been 
chipped away.
25
  Recent procedural changes made by the Court,
26
 the 
rulemaking committees,
27
 and Congress
28
 show pronounced move-
 
 24 Spencer refers to it as a “slide.”  A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide To-
ward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 201 (2009). 
 25 See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the ‘Litigation Explosion,’ 
‘Liability Crisis,’ and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commit-
ments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984–87 (2003); Spencer, supra note 7, at 358; Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
965, 996 (1998). 
 26 For example, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided the “trilogy” of summary 
judgment cases—Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986).  Through these cases, the Court made critical changes to summary 
judgment practice.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.  More recently, the Court stunned 
most commentators with its decisions on pleadings.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also discussion infra 
Part IV.B.  In those cases, the Court departed from notice pleading by “retiring” Con-
ley’s “no-set-of-facts” language and by requiring plaintiffs to plead enough facts to 
state a “plausible” claim.  Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); 
see also discussion infra Part IV.A.   
 27 For example, Rule 11 sanction amendments were adopted in 1983 to require 
mandatory sanctions for frivolous filings.  See WALTER R. MANSFIELD, REPORT FROM THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES TO STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE 3–4 (1982).  Many commentators believe this rule had a chilling ef-
fect on plaintiffs’ claims and that it was unfairly applied to some substantive legal 
claims but not others.  E.g., Melissa Nelkin, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11—
Some ‘Chilling’ Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1313 (1986); Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171 (1994).  
But see Richard Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater, the Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 797–99 (1993) (disputing some of the claims about the impact of 
Rule 11).  Even with the softening of Rule 11 in 1993, some commentators assert that 
the rule continues to have a harsher effect on claimants with lower resources, claim-
ants who tend to bring substantive claims like discrimination. See Stempel, supra note 
25, at 994, 997 (“[B]oth the 1983 Amendment and the 1993 Amendment represent 
increased procedural hurdles and risk for litigants, resulting in a net shrinkage of 
access to courts . . . .  We have seen that fraud, discrimination, and civil rights claims 
are subject to increasing resistance and procedural impediment [including, but not 
limited to, the changes to Rule 11].”); Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 855, 897 (1992) (“Nevertheless, an incorrect balance was struck because the 
proposed [1993 version of the] Rule will insufficiently ameliorate the burdens for 
parties and attorneys, particularly poorer ones.”).  Similarly, the rules have been 
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amended to restrict discovery.  Mandatory initial discovery, which was intended to 
minimize the need to engage in the discovery process over documents that would 
ultimately be produced, became a battleground for further efforts to restrict the pro-
cedural rules.  See STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS 72–111 (1992). 
The initial Rule 26 provision required the mandatory initial production of material 
related to the subject matter of the litigation.  Virginia E. Hench, Mandatory Disclosure 
and Equal Access to Justice: The 1993 Federal Discovery Rules Amendments and the Just, 
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 180, 196 (1994).  
In many ways, this could have been viewed as the Brady Rule for civil litigation—a 
rule meant to equalize the asymmetry of information before litigating a claim.  See 
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of 
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 808–12 (1991).  But, by 2000, the rule was amended 
to limit the obligation to make initial disclosures to those related to the party’s claim 
or defense.  See Jeffrey Stempel, Politics & Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of 
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 549 (2001) (reviewing the then-proposed amendment’s 
provisions). This change now allows defendants to withhold evidence that might help 
a plaintiff’s claim until such time as she is skillful enough to properly request it.  Id. 
at 570, 603.   
 28 For example, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1955 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).  For related changes, see also the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-352, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  Among other things, the PSLRA required height-
ened pleading for securities violations, and it limited discovery for plaintiffs until a 
motion to dismiss was decided by the court.   PSLRA § 101(a); see Hillary A. Sale, 
Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-
Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 552–61 (1998) 
(providing an overview of the PSLRA).  Commentators opined that the Act made it 
more difficult to bring securities violation claims.  See Ho Young Lee & Vivek Mande, 
The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of 
Client Managers of Big 6 and Non-Big 6 Auditors, 22 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 94 
(2003) (“There is anecdotal and empirical evidence suggesting that the passage of 
PSLRA did make it more difficult for investors to bring securities-related lawsuits 
against parties with deep pockets, such as auditors and underwriters.”); Hillary A. 
Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002) (arguing that the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirements have eliminated litigation at the motion to dis-
miss stage, when in the very least, the litigation was better suited for summary judg-
ment or trial).  But see Kevin P. Roddy, Nine Years of Practice and Procedure Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SLO20 ALI-ABA 749, 756 (2005) 
(“[T]here has been no material decrease in the volume of securities fraud class ac-
tions filed in federal court since the passage of the PSLRA.”).  More recently, Con-
gress passed the CAFA, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over class 
actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and at least one of the 
plaintiffs is diverse from the defendant. Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1620 (2006).  The stated goal of the legisla-
tion was to curb litigation abuse in state courts, but many commentators believe the 
purpose was to ensure that class action defendants have a friendlier federal forum 
when sued.  See e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the Right 
to Affordable Justice, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 448–49 (2010); see also Helen Norton, Re-
shaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1003, 1038 (2006) (“Critics point out that CAFA has shifted bargaining power 
to defendants by denying plaintiffs access to the forum of their choice.  Most corpo-
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ment from rules that reflect a liberal procedural approach to rules 
that reflect a restrictive one.
29
 
Myriad justifications are given for the shift in procedural doc-
trine.  For example, when Congress passed the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 (CAFA), which expanded federal jurisdiction over class 
actions,
30
 CAFA supporters warned of biased state-court judges and 
the need for a “neutral” forum for adjudication of class actions.
31
  
Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, when the Court altered the pleading re-
quirements to require plaintiffs to meet a plausibility standard, it jus-
tified this change by asserting that implausible claims unnecessarily 
occupied the judicial system and defendants.
32
  The Court rejected 
the argument that judges could manage cases, specifically the discov-
ery process, well enough to protect defendants from meritless 
claims.
33
  While these are only two specific examples of restrictive 
procedural changes and articulated justifications, they reflect the 
same uniting principle that underlies the justifications for the recent 
procedural shift.  The principle is that the goal of filtering out all—or 
nearly all—frivolous claims outweighs the goal of allowing all—or 
nearly all—meritorious claims to survive.  In other words, the system 
is at the tension point discussed above, and judges, lawmakers, and 
rulemakers have determined that frivolous claims are the greater evil. 
 
rate defendants prefer a federal forum, in large part because they win more often 
there.”). 
 29 Spencer, supra note 7, at 358–66.  The impetus for this move is largely due to 
the pressure borne by what commentators have called a “litigation explosion.”  The 
idea of a litigation explosion took root in 1977 when Bayless Manning coined the 
term “hyperlexis” to describe what he believed was a dire situation in America’s civil 
litigation system.  Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 
767 (1977).  Like a disease, he argued, Americans were suing one another without 
due regard to the merits of their claims and, worse than that, the adjudicatory system 
could not properly control this litigation.  Id. at 767–68.  However, since that time, 
scholars have convincingly shown that the charge of a litigation explosion was both 
overstated and not supported by empirical data.  See generally Marc Galanter, The Day 
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986) (questioning the alleged increase 
in civil litigation once one accounts for the changes in substantive law that created 
additional rights); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 
J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 636 (1997) (finding that most of the punitive damages awards in 
civil litigation are in business litigation matters, not personal injury). But the damage 
had been done.  Many in the public and private sector believed then, and still believe 
now, that the litigation system is in a state of disrepair.  See Miller, supra note 25, at 
984–87. 
 30 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.   
 31 See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 32 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949–51, 1953–54 (2009). 
 33 Id. at 1953–55. 
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B. The Beneficiaries of a Restrictive Ethos 
Knowing that the civil justice system is now governed by a restric-
tive procedural regime, it is imperative to know and understand who 
benefits from such a regime.  This analysis requires an understanding 
of what federal civil litigation looks like—who are the players, what 
are the claims, and who is winning? 
In a 2000 study, Professor Gillian Hadfield determined that in 
over eighty percent of federal civil cases, the defendant was an organ-
ization, and in almost seventy percent of federal civil cases, the plain-
tiff was an individual.
34
  Thus, the majority of cases filed in federal 
court pit an individual plaintiff against an organizational defendant.  
These statistics matter because organizational defendants approach 
litigation from a different perspective than individual plaintiffs.  As 
defendants, for the most part, organizations are not as concerned 
with the public trial
35
—access to a public forum is not as high a priori-
ty for them.  To the contrary, organizations are generally concerned 
with lowering ultimate litigation costs—their concerns are economi-
cally driven.
36
  Like all players who are in a conflict, organizational de-
fendants will be satisfied when they win any litigation in which they 
are engaged.  But, unlike individual plaintiffs, organizational defend-
ants are at best neutral regarding when that win occurs.  If the litiga-
 
 34 Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: 
Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civ-
il Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1298 (2005).  In approximately sixty percent of federal 
civil cases, an individual plaintiff sued an organizational defendant; in approximately 
twenty-two percent of the cases, an organizational plaintiff sued an organizational 
defendant; in approximately ten percent of the cases, an individual plaintiff sued an 
individual defendant; and in approximately eight percent of the cases, an organiza-
tion sued an individual.  Id.  For organizational defendant, I adopt Hadfield’s defini-
tion, which includes businesses and government agencies.  Id. at 1292.  Finally, Had-
field’s overall data excludes prisoner litigation and cases where the United States 
sues for recovery on a defaulted student loan.  Id. at 1286–87, 1299. 
 35 There are exceptions to this statement, of course.  For example, a corporation 
may consider a public trial that ends in its favor to serve an important deterrent ef-
fect to future litigation.  Or, an entity may wish to draw out a trial in order to run up 
costs for the plaintiff, incentivizing her to settle or drop the case.  The point is that 
the public airing of grievances is generally not as profoundly valued by an organiza-
tional defendant as it is by an individual plaintiff.   
 36 Hadfield, supra note 34, at 1311–12.  This is not to say that plaintiffs and their 
attorneys are not concerned about litigation costs.  They are.  But, the calculus is dif-
ferent.  Plaintiffs and their attorneys want to win, and to do so, that generally re-
quires that they get their paradigmatic day in court.  See discussion infra Part III.B.  
They want to conserve costs in order to get to that day, while defendants will general-
ly be willing to spend more to avoid the risk of a trial.  See discussion infra Part III.B.  
In other words, defendants are far more likely to spend a predictable amount in or-
der to avoid the less predictable risk of a trial.  In that sense, they are more allergic to 
the ultimate and unknowable litigation costs than plaintiffs.  
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tion ends before the merits are reached at trial, an organizational de-
fendant will be satisfied with that result, whereas an individual plain-
tiff may have benefitted from a public trial even if she ultimately 
lost.
37
  Because organizational defendants are not as concerned about 
reaching the merits in a public forum, they have a greater incentive 
to support a more restrictive approach to procedural doctrine.
38
 
And, these defendants have extensive resources with which to in-
fluence the development of procedural doctrine and with which to 
engage in litigation.  As Elizabeth Cabraser explains, “most individu-
als do not possess the time or resources to maintain complex litiga-
tion at the trial and appellate levels against the large and well-
capitalized corporate entities with which the vast majority of com-
mercial, employment, and consumer transactions occur, and from 
which such litigation arises.”
39
 
First, unlike most individual plaintiffs, organizational defendants 
can hire monolithic premier law firms.  Large law firms are a fairly 
recent development.  In 1970, the largest law firms had a few hun-
dred centralized lawyers, but now the largest firms have thousands of 
lawyers that span the globe.
40
  The size of the law firm is not all that 
matters—what is equally critical is the focus of the kind of law prac-
ticed in those firms.  A study of Chicago lawyers by John Heinz and 
Edward Laumann found that, from 1975 to 1995, the legal effort for 
 
 37 These benefits include those that stem from participation.  See E. ALLEN LIND & 
TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 206−15 (1988).  Even 
when the substantive result is not what she hoped for, the fact that an individual was 
able to participate lends credence to her perceptions of the legitimacy of the system 
and about the process by which her claim was adjudicated.  See id.  For the individual, 
this is critical because she feels heard.  Professor Deseriee A. Kennedy has written 
that “[p]retrial dismissal means that not only are individual plaintiffs denied the op-
portunity to recover for their harms, but they are stripped of the right to publicly 
present their stories and have them ‘authenticated,’ create a public record of the 
events, and have their cases decided by a jury.”  Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing Civil 
Rights Summary Judgment and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 
996 (2004).   
 38 For example, Hadfield determined in her study that organizational plaintiffs 
were more likely than individual plaintiffs to settle a case.  Hadfield, supra note 34, at 
1281.  She suggested, “The higher settlement rate among organizational plaintiffs, 
which is basically the same whether an organization is suing an individual or another 
organization, may suggest that organizational plaintiffs are less interested in rule 
change or precedent than individual plaintiffs, despite the one-shot nature of many 
individual plaintiffs.”  Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). 
 39 See Cabraser, supra note 28, at 440.  However, the effect of the economic de-
cline on big law firms cannot be ignored.  See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of 
Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749.  The impact of that decline on defendants’ power, 
whether the trend continues or not, is unknown.   
 40 See Hadfield, supra note 34, at 1284.   
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corporate and organizational clients rose from fifty-three percent to 
sixty-four percent.
41
  In contrast, legal effort devoted to what the 
scholars called “personal plight” (meaning family, employment, crim-
inal defense, personal injury, etc.) fell from twenty-one percent to six-
teen percent during the same period.
42
  In other words, the landscape 
of the kind of law handled by these large firms has changed signifi-
cantly.  Moreover, these law firms are “repeat players” in litigation, 
which means that they can use their experience, knowledge, and in-
fluence for a myriad of clients.
43
  It is not just that an organizational 
defendant itself has greater economic and political resources than its 
adversary in litigation, it is that the law firm that such a defendant 
hires also has greater resources than its adversary’s counsel.  This is 
because an individual plaintiff will generally hire a solo practitioner 
who, by virtue of the structure of her practice, will lack access to a 
large law firm’s collective knowledge and power.
44
  As Hadfield ex-
plains, “These differences in the scale of practice have significant im-
plications for the resources organizations and individuals bring to 
bear on litigation . . . .”  Beyond economic resources, organizational 
defendants gain greater power because “lawyers with corporate and 
organizational clients also tend to have higher levels of influence and 
prestige within the profession.”
45
  Organizational defendants’ legal 
counsel can therefore exercise their power and resources to push the 
development of procedural law in a direction that is most beneficial 
to their clients.  When viewed in the context of a larger ideological 
movement that has won the rhetoric battle—one that speaks of “dis-
covery costs” and “frivolous claims”
46
—it is easier to see how the pres-
sure that organizational defendants bring to bear on the structure of 
procedural rules has arguably resulted in cases like Iqbal and the 
broader move toward a restrictive procedural regime.
47
 
 
 41 John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, The Changing Character of Lawyers’ Work: 
Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 765 (1998). 
 42 Id.  
 43 Hadfield, supra note 34, at 1319.   
 44 As Hadfield explains,  
Overall, we know that lawyers serving individual clients tend to work in 
solo and small-firm practice settings, while those serving organizations 
and corporations either work within the organization itself as in-house 
counsel or in large, often multistate if not multinational, law firms.    
Id. at 1285; see also Cabraser, supra note 28, at 454.   
 45 Hadfield, supra note 34, at 1285.  Hadfield further notes, “Indeed, ‘prestige’ is 
arguably defined within the legal profession as distance from serving individual cli-
ents.”  Id.   
 46 See Miller, supra note 25, at 984; Thomas, supra note 23, at 645.   
 47 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Second, beyond hiring prestigious law firms to litigate and shape 
procedural doctrine, organizational defendants can directly influence 
the development of procedural doctrine through Congress and the 
Civil Rules Committee.  For example, business entities heavily influ-
enced the adoption of recent restrictive procedural laws like the 
CAFA and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
48
  
Lobbying efforts were waged on both sides, but one cannot ignore 
the influence that business interests had on these legislative efforts.
49
  
Business entities and their lobbying organizations have had a palpa-
ble impact on rules adopted by the Civil Rules Committee as well.
50
  
Moreover, due to its composition, the committee is incredibly recep-
tive to the viewpoints of those organizations.
51
  Again, some individual 
plaintiff interests are similarly represented at the rulemaking level, 
but the influence of business interests is greater.
52
 
 
 48 See Stephen Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008) (“Some of the political and so-
cial implications of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) are hard to miss.  
That statute, after all, resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the 
aisle by interest groups associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), partisan 
wrangling, and, following two successful filibusters, fragile compromises.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a “Substantive Right”: The 
Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 1194 (2000).  
Kelleher explains: 
On occasion, lobbyists have convinced Congress to bypass the rulemak-
ing process entirely, and provide special procedures for specific classes 
of cases by legislation, in order to favor certain interest groups.  An ob-
vious, and egregious, example is the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), enacted in response to intense lobbying 
efforts by accounting, securities, and high-tech firms, which perceived 
themselves as victimized by abusive securities lawsuits.  Rather than al-
ter the substantive standards for such suits, Congress in the PSLRA 
provided procedural rules favorable to defendants, to tilt the balance 
in securities litigation in favor of the defendant at virtually every junc-
ture.  
Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).   
 49 See Burbank, supra note 48 at 1441; Kelleher, supra note 48 at 1194; see also 
John F. Harris & William Branigin, Bush Signs Class-Action Changes into Law, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35084-
2005Feb18.html (“Business groups sought the change because federal courts tradi-
tionally have been less sympathetic to class-action cases brought by plaintiffs who 
claim to have been victimized by corporate fraud or negligence.”).  
 50 See Coleman, supra note 21, at 294–95.   
 51 The members of the committee who are defense lawyers well outnumber the 
members of the committee who are plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Id. at 294.  In addition, there 
is a large number of judges on the committee, which only adds to the sense that the 
committee itself is incredibly elite.  Id. at 290. 
 52 See id. at 294. 
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Ultimately, organizational defendants are willing to invest time 
and effort in the development of procedural doctrine because it af-
fects how litigation proceeds and whether those cases get to a jury tri-
al.  Hadfield’s study found that, in 34.5% of the cases between an in-
dividual plaintiff and an organizational defendant, the case 
terminated in a non-trial adjudication, which  means, in most cases, 
dismissal or summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
53
  The cas-
es terminated in a bench trial only 7.3% of the time and in a jury trial 
or directed verdict only 2.6% of the time.
54
  These numbers demon-
strate that organizational defendants know that the procedural rules 
governing what happens before trial are important.  This is especially 
true because 53.1% of the cases between an individual plaintiff and 
an organizational defendant settle.
55
  If the parties know that their 
case is more likely to be resolved in a pre-trial adjudication as op-
posed to a full-blown trial, the parties will certainly factor the effect of 
procedural rules into their settlement calculus.
56
  In other words, the 
parties conduct their settlement negotiations not just in the shadow 
of a jury trial, but also in the shadow of pre-trial adjudication. 
Through this expansive access to the institutions responsible for 
creating procedural doctrine, organizational defendants have influ-
enced and driven the creation of a restrictive procedural regime.  As 
explained above, they have every incentive to do so, and they have 
the resources with which to affect the change they desire.  The ques-
tion addressed in the next Part is who are the plaintiffs who, while 
equally incentivized, do not have the resources and organizational 
power to influence procedural changes in their favor?
57
 
 
 53 Hadfield, supra note 34, at 1317, 1322.   
 54 Id.   
 55 Id. 
 56 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About 
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990). 
 57 One possible response to this litigation picture, specifically with respect to the 
movement from a liberal to a restrictive ethos, is that this movement is a correction.  
In other words, one could argue that the liberal ethos unduly benefitted individual 
(and vanishing) plaintiffs, and that the changes that have occurred over the past thir-
ty years in procedural doctrine are a righting of that imbalance.  There is no evi-
dence to support this position, yet there is decidedly no hard evidence to the contra-
ry either.  It is by all accounts a matter of perspective.  However, looking to those who 
originally drafted the rules, it is undeniable that they were guided by a liberal ethos.  
See generally Marcus, supra note 15.  And that ethos was reflective of a desire to have 
equality and fairness in litigation.  Clark wrote that “[r]egular procedure is necessary 
to secure equal treatment for all; it is necessary, too, for the quite as important factor 
of the appearance of equal treatment for all.”  CLARK, supra note 19, at 70 (emphasis 
added).  In that sense, the drafters’ intent for the procedural rules was neutrality—
they desired a system that would not benefit either side.  Neutrality and fairness, not 
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III. THE VANISHING PLAINTIFF DEFINED 
As discussed above, a shift in procedural doctrine has occurred, 
and that shift benefits organizational defendants.  The question then 
becomes who is negatively impacted by this change?
58
  Defining the 
vanishing plaintiff is a difficult exercise, but there are two primary 
factors that guide an understanding of who this plaintiff is and why a 
restrictive procedural regime so disfavors her claims.  First, the van-
ishing plaintiff is often economically disadvantaged—not so much 
that she must file pro se, but so much so that she cannot hire expen-
sive legal services.  Second, the vanishing plaintiff’s social presenta-
tion is outside the dominant gender, sexual, racial, and/or cultural 
norms, resulting in an inability to effectively communicate a persua-
sive narrative. 
A vanishing plaintiff may be affected by both of these factors or 
she may have just one.  It is impossible to construct a durable descrip-
tion of this plaintiff that is one-dimensional.  Instead, the defining 
factors are fluid and subject to great variation based on the interac-
tion between the vanishing plaintiff, procedural rule(s), and substan-
tive claims.  The base assumption is that vanishing plaintiffs are mar-
ginalized in some way.  They vanish when particular factors interact 
with restrictive procedural rules and push plaintiffs out of the system. 
 
beneficial treatment of plaintiffs, was the goal of a liberal ethos.  Yet, as argued in this 
Article, such fairness is not being achieved under a restrictive procedural regime.  In 
the alternative, even if it were the case that the liberal ethos favored plaintiffs such 
that the last thirty years were a righting of sorts, any such “correction” should still 
take account of the vanishing plaintiff for the reasons discussed infra Part III.C.   
 58 As discussed in the Introduction, Spencer argues that “social out-groups” are 
the victims of a restrictive ethos.  Spencer, supra note 7, at 370.  He borrows this con-
cept from critical race theory literature, and to a degree, the label fits.  See generally 
Erik K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990) (arguing that procedural reforms made for the 
sake of efficiency have negatively affected marginalized groups—what he refers to as 
“minorities asserting marginal rights claims”—more than mainstream plaintiffs).  
However, the term social out-groups does not completely capture the complexity of 
how particular people are marginalized by restrictive procedural rules.  In other 
words, Spencer provides an attractive term, but he does not otherwise elaborate on 
how being outside of the social and political mainstream makes an individual more 
prone to suffer from a restrictive procedural regime than an insider.  Moreover, this 
general term does not capture the fact that restrictive procedural rules may not 
equally affect those who are political and social outsiders.  For example, when institu-
tional plaintiffs represent such individuals, they will not suffer as much as similarly 
situated individuals represented by a solo practitioner.  See discussion infra Part III.A.   
Thus, a more robust description of which plaintiffs are most affected is required. 
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A. Lack of Access to Legal Counsel 
The disparity between legal services available to individual plain-
tiffs and organizational defendants is critical to understanding the 
vanishing plaintiff.  As discussed above, organizations receive the li-
on’s share of legal services in the United States.  In a recent study, 
Gillian Hadfield determined that in 2005, the total expenditures 
made by Americans (individuals and organizations) on legal services 
reached $277 billion.
59
  Of that, about thirty-one percent was services 
provided to individuals who personally paid for these services, about 
one percent was provided by legal aid lawyers and public defenders, 
and another roughly eight percent was provided by government law-
yers (who, the study assumed, provided services to individuals).
60
  All 
told, about forty percent of the legal services provided in the United 
States go to individual citizens.
61
  The remaining sixty percent go to 
serving organizations.
62
  To break down the numbers even further, 
Hadfield determined that in 2005, on average, individuals in this 
country received 1.3 hours of legal services, or 3.34 hours per house-
hold.
63
  This is a critically low number when one considers the legal 
needs that arise for individual citizens.  A study conducted by the 
American Bar Association in 1993 found that approximately fifty per-
cent of the households in the United States were experiencing an 
event that could be construed as a legal need.
64
  Yet, the number of 
hours expended on legal services for these individuals cannot be 
meeting such a high level of necessity.
65
 
Therefore, the result must be that many individuals simply do 
not seek or cannot find legal services.  For many, they cannot afford 
legal help.  In 2005, a study determined that there were only 6,581 
 
 59 Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the 
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 144 (2010).  
That is approximately $226 billion in GDP terms.  Id. 
 60 Id.   
 61 Id.   
 62 Id.   
 63 Id. at 146.  And this number of hours declined by twenty percent from the 
number of hours in 1990, which was 1.6 hours per person and 4.15 hours per average 
household.  Id. at 145. 
 64 Id. at 135.   
 65 This is true on a comparative basis as well.  When Hadfield looked at the re-
sources available to citizens in other countries versus citizens of the United States, 
she discovered that U.S. citizens have far fewer legal resources available to them.  
Hadfield, supra note 59, at 149.  For example, in the United States, the amount of 
legal aid per capita was thirteen dollars, while in countries such as the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, it was twenty-nine dollars and seventy-six dollars, respec-
tively.  Id.   
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legal aid attorneys—only one-half of one percent of all United States 
attorneys—providing civil legal services.
66
  Another study determined 
that there is only one lawyer for every 9,000 Americans who qualify 
for legal aid.
67
  It comes as no surprise then that in 1994, a study 
found that thirty-eight percent of poor individuals with legal needs 
did not take any steps to remedy their situations.
68
  The reality is that 
individuals in this country, especially poor individuals, simply do not 
have access to the legal services necessary to pursue their grievances 
or disputes.  As Hadfield explained, “[T]he vast majority of the legal 
problems faced by (particularly poor) Americans fall outside of the 
‘rule of law,’ with high proportions of people . . . simply accepting a 
result determined not by law but by the play of markets, power, or-
ganizations, wealth, politics, and other dynamics in a complex socie-
ty.”
69
  In point of fact, a recent study determined that the United 
States ranked lowest among eleven developed nations in providing 
access to justice for its citizens.
70
  A major factor in this ranking is the 
inability of lower income individuals to procure legal assistance.
71
 
With so many lawyers in our country, it might seem counterintu-
itive that there is a population with legal needs that are not being 
served.  Much of the problem is one of economics for the lawyers 
themselves.  In a recent article, Elizabeth Cabraser opines that many 
practitioners will not take “meritorious claims with damages of less 
than $1 million” because claims less than $1 million are “economical-
ly unfeasible to prosecute.”
72
  There are complex reasons as to why 
these claims are not economically feasible, but, Cabraser asserts, one 
of the contributors to the exorbitant cost of justice is “[t]he ability of 
a few citizens, notably corporate citizens, to afford due process at any 
 
 66 Id. at 140.   
 67 David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest 
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 542–43 (1994). 
 68 Hadfield, supra note 59, at 139.  More recent studies have put that number 
even higher.  Id. at 142.   
 69 Id. at 143. (footnote omitted). 
 70 MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 106 
(2010), available at 
http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP%20Rule%20of%20Law
%20Index%202010_2_0.pdf. 
 71 See Dan Froomkin, Access to Justice in the U.S. at Third-World Levels, Says Survey, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010 
/10/14/access-to-justice-in-us-a_n_762355.html.  
 72 Cabraser, supra note 28, at 440.   
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cost, and to insist upon all of the process they can afford.”
73
  Presum-
ably Cabraser is not just referring to the procedural rules, but that is 
certainly part of her critique.  Her argument is that organizations, by 
virtue of their resources and power, can afford to make litigation cost-
prohibitive for many individuals, even those individuals who have 
meritorious claims. 
Many vanishing plaintiffs are economically marginalized.  Thus, 
given this legal services landscape, when a vanishing plaintiff has a 
grievance, her first issue is whether she can afford a lawyer.
74
  Assum-
ing she has just enough to hire a lawyer, the vanishing plaintiff is like-
ly to suffer differently in one of two ways.  First, assuming she finds a 
well-qualified lawyer, that lawyer may not be able to expend the re-
sources necessary to fully utilize and/or respond to the use of proce-
dure.  This is true even when the plaintiff has found a lawyer to take 
her case on a contingency-fee basis.  In either case, a restrictive pro-
cedural regime may force a lawyer to forego a particular claim or 
 
 73 Id.; see also THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR 
WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
10 (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ 
lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/costciv3.pdf.  In this Federal Judicial Center survey, attor-
neys for both plaintiffs and defendants acknowledged that the billing mechanism 
that most defendant law firms follow is a driving force for the use of procedure.  Id.  
An attorney for defendants stated,  
Yes, the size of the law firm matters. Large firms are the worst.  There’s 
an element of the lawyers not having enough work to do and they do 
more than necessary.  They staff up a case beyond its needs, for exam-
ple, sending two or more lawyers to attend a deposition or any other 
proceeding.   
Id.  An attorney for plaintiffs added, “We have a saying in the plaintiffs’ bar that ‘You 
have to feed the tiger first’ before defendant attorneys will settle a case.  Another 
simply said: ‘That’s how they get paid.  They do not want to talk settlement until they 
get their hours in.  That’s the system.’”  Id.  See generally William G. Ross, The Ethics of 
Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991) (evaluating the effect of hourly 
billing rates for civil defense attorneys).  
 74 The plaintiff can choose to file pro se as well.  Procedurally, this may actually 
give her an advantage.  As a pro se litigant, she is in large measure throwing herself 
on the mercy of the court.  However, the common law rules construing pro se filings 
are fairly generous, so she may actually benefit from that status in her litigation.  For 
example, a court must read pro se pleadings more liberally than those drafted by 
counsel.  Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  Thus, the restrictive nature of 
procedural rules may not have as great an impact on pro se litigants because courts 
tend to give a more generous construction to the rules as applied to pro se filers.  For 
example, in Erikson v. Pardus, the Court, following Twombly, appeared to apply the 
plausibility standard more liberally to the prisoner pro se litigant in that case than to 
the well-represented plaintiffs in Twombly.  551 U.S. 89, 94–95 (2007).  So, while pro 
se litigants are no doubt presented with quite a challenging feat in attempting to liti-
gate their own actions, restrictive procedural rules may not be the greatest of their 
worries.  
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claims because the procedural cost of pursuing that claim outweighs 
the potential benefit of success.
75
  Moreover, a defendant’s well-
resourced team will capitalize on this resource disparity.  As discussed 
earlier, if a defendant can eliminate a case on procedural grounds, 
before reaching the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, he will absolutely 
do so.  As counsel for R.J. Reynolds explained during tobacco litiga-
tion in 1993, 
[T]he aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions 
and discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely 
burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs’ lawyers, particularly solo 
practitioners.  To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won the-
se cases was not by spending all of [RJR]’s money, but by making 
that other son of a bitch spend all of his.
76
  
Second, in some instances, the lawyer will not be qualified to ad-
dress the complexity of federal civil procedure.  The lawyer might on-
ly be versed in state procedural rules that may not reflect their federal 
counterparts.  Worse yet, the lawyer may just not be that good.  As 
Professor Marc Galanter noted, most individuals who litigate are like-
ly to bring only one case in their lifetime—a category of people he re-
ferred to as “one-shotters.”
77
  Galanter posited that the lawyers who 
represent these “one-shotters” are generally from the “‘lower eche-
lons’ of the legal profession.”
78
  In most cases, money will buy you a 
higher-quality lawyer; thus, a plaintiff with little means to bring her 
case may find herself out-spent and out-witted by a defendant who 
has a full array of resources.  Stated differently, an individual with low 
economic resources who can scrape together enough to hire a lawyer 
will not find generous treatment by virtue of her financial status.  By 
hiring a lawyer, the plaintiff allows the court and her adversaries to 
give her the same treatment that they would give any other well-
represented plaintiff. 
This raises the question of whether the well-regarded lawyer who 
takes claims on a contingency-fee basis can help the vanishing plain-
tiff.  It is here where the vanishing plaintiff’s existence outside of the 
social mainstream and her economic status may converge.  The best 
option for a plaintiff with low economic resources is to find a good 
lawyer who will take her case on a contingency.  However, the good 
 
 75 See Cabraser, supra note 28, at 440. 
 76 Id. at 461 (quoting Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J. 
1993)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).     
 77 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Le-
gal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974–1975). 
 78 Id. at 116. 
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lawyer will consider both the merits of that plaintiff’s claim and the 
potential recovery, as well as the plaintiff’s social status, appearance, 
and other social cues.  For example, even when the merits are good 
and, as Cabraser points out, even where the potential recovery 
worthwhile, the lawyer may still choose to turn down the case.  The 
lawyer must ask herself an exhaustive list of questions: Does the plain-
tiff have a criminal record?  Is she gainfully employed, and if so, 
where?  Does she have children?  How many?  Is she married?  These 
questions are all ones that jurors or a judge would ask themselves, 
and the answers categorize people in ways that while not fair, are un-
deniable.  Good lawyers who are concerned with winning cases for 
their clients must ask themselves these questions before taking on a 
case.  While many claims may not actually get to a jury, litigation 
happens with a view toward a potential jury trial, so in that sense, the 
lawyer must consider how the jury will view her potential client.  The 
lawyer must also weigh the judge’s perception of the client.  So, if a 
potential plaintiff is a single mother, recovering addict, and ex-
convict, a lawyer may not take that case—regardless of the quality of 
the claim—because a jury and/or judge will not be sympathetic to a 
person and may, in fact, sit in social judgment of that person. 
This is especially true if another plaintiff with a similar claim and 
economic status, but without “negative” answers to these questions, is 
available.  Given the choice between the two, the lawyer will take the 
potential client with the higher perceived social status.  The same is 
true for institutional plaintiffs like the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion.  These plaintiffs are powerful players, but even they engage in a 
“sifting” of sorts when selecting their clients.  They have to take the 
best representative plaintiff, and this necessarily means eliminating 
plaintiffs who are somehow outside of mainstream norms.
79
  In this 
way, the plaintiff who is an outsider is left with a choice of not pursu-
ing her claim at all, filing pro se, or hiring a less qualified lawyer.  
This is not much of a choice, however.  She either does not pursue 
her claim at all, subjects herself to the societal judgments of the judge 
who reviews her pro se petition, or pays a lawyer who cannot navigate 
 
 79 See Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal: Is It Too Soon to Petition the Supreme Court on 
Gay Marriage?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at 40, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa_fact_talbot. The au-
thor describes how the lawyers handling the litigation challenging California’s refer-
endum banning gay marriage carefully selected their representative litigants—two 
upstanding, white, and successful couples.  Id.  Talbot wrote, “It isn’t easy to find the 
right plaintiffs for a high-profile constitutional case.  There have been plaintiffs be-
fore the Supreme Court who made moving and stalwart examples of the principle 
they were upholding, and plaintiffs who faltered on the job.”  Id. at 44.   
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the fierce procedural waters of federal court.  Any way she looks at it, 
her claim is unlikely to see the light of day.  She is a vanishing plain-
tiff. 
B. Inability to Effectively Communicate a Narrative 
Along with the difficulties of accessing legal counsel, the vanish-
ing plaintiff confronts another significant problem that is exacerbat-
ed by restrictive procedural rules.  That problem is an inability to 
communicate her legal narrative.  Because of the vanishing plaintiff’s 
gender, sexuality, race, and/or culture, and the claims that will arise 
from those attributes, the vanishing plaintiff is often required to 
communicate a legal narrative that is outside of the norm.  The best 
chance she has at effectively communicating that narrative is to be 
able to tell her whole story, most critically at a trial.
80
  Yet, the reality 
of a restrictive procedural regime is that trials are a rarity.
81
  Moreo-
ver, even when she is able to tell her story in a non-trial event, such as 
in a motion for summary judgment, her audience is a person who 
likely has almost nothing in common with her—the judge.  That 
combination—losing the narrative opportunity at trial and being lim-
ited to a homogenous audience—makes the vanishing plaintiff’s 
claims much less tenable. 
In other words, the result of a restrictive procedural regime runs 
completely counter to what a vanishing plaintiff needs to launch a 
successful claim.  For example, motions to dismiss limit the narrative 
to a short pleading that only articulates the basic facts known to the 
plaintiff at the time.  Moreover, she is unable to confidently articulate 
pertinent facts that she suspects are true because the defendant has 
those facts in its province.
82
  Restrictive discovery rules also limit the 
plaintiff’s access to the full story.  The defendant does not have to 
come forward with information pertinent to the plaintiff’s claim until 
it is requested in an exacting and often exhausting process.
83
  Finally, 
motions for summary judgment—a primary way in which claims are 
resolved—are decided by judges who only have access to the written, 
 
 80 “Law, like every discipline and profession is constituted by its stories.”  James R. 
Elkins, From the Symposium Editor, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1990).  Thus, in order to 
succeed under the law, the plaintiff must tell a convincing legal narrative.   
 81 See discussion supra Part II.B.  For an argument that trials should be restored, 
see Stephen Burbank & Stephen Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic 
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 414 (2011). 
 82 See discussion supra Part IV.A.  
 83 See supra note 27 (discussing the impact of changes to Rule 26). 
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often piecemeal story.
84
  Thus, while the success of a vanishing plain-
tiff’s claim will turn on her ability to communicate her complete and 
nuanced legal story, restrictive procedural doctrine works against that 
success. 
For instance, scholars have repeatedly argued that when it comes 
to proving racial or sexual discrimination, restrictive procedural doc-
trines are difficult to overcome.
85
  Because of the vanishing plaintiff’s 
gender, sexuality, race, and/or culture, these are the kinds of claims 
that she will often bring.  Yet, discrimination claims require a holistic 
understanding of the plaintiff’s circumstances, and restrictive proce-
dural rules do not allow for the creation of that picture.  For exam-
ple, summary judgment requires a judge to “slice and dice” the facts 
of a case into separate parts that can be independently assessed.
86
  
However, discrimination claims require, often legally but also practi-
cally, a weighing of the totality of the alleged victim’s experiences.  It 
is difficult to construct such a totality through the use of affidavits 
and selected sections of depositions, as is required in a procedure like 
summary judgment.  Judges often view the case through its separate 
elements and that lends itself to a fragmentary view of the facts, not a 
collective one. 
In addition, the make-up of the federal bench is decidedly dif-
ferent from the make-up of the vanishing plaintiff.  The federal 
bench is largely composed of white men.
87
  This is not to say that all 
white male judges are incapable of or insensitive to the substance of 
vanishing plaintiffs’ claims, but it is to say that the worldview of these 
judges varies significantly from that of the plaintiffs who bring these 
 
 84 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 85 See, e.g., Theresa Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment 
Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Kennedy, supra note 37; Natasha Martin, 
Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of 
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 766–67 
(2007).  
 86 See Schneider, supra note 85, at 722.   
 87 See Carl Tobias, Diversity on the Federal Bench, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202434429480&slreturn=1.   
Women and ethnic minorities have long been underrepresented in the 
federal judiciary compared with the U.S. population.  Eighty-four per-
cent of federal judges are white.  Female jurists comprise twenty per-
cent.  African-Americans constitute eight percent.  Out of the almost 
1,300 sitting federal judges, a mere eleven are Asian-American and only 
one is a Native American.  A significant percentage of the ninety-four 
federal districts has never had a jurist who is a woman or a person of 
color. 
 Id.  
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claims.
88
  In that sense, being outside of a dominant mainstream per-
ception of gender, sexuality, race, and/or culture means that as a 
plaintiff, that person has a more difficult task in communicating her 
story.  This means that when the plaintiff and her claim are outside of 
that single judge’s normative view of the world, it makes her case 
even more difficult to pursue. 
Because cases are largely decided by (or settled based upon the 
anticipation of) one judge’s view of the law, it is worth thinking about 
how that judge’s normative viewpoints might be problematic.  Indi-
viduals can disagree about the objective meaning of the law, and it is 
largely the case that those differences in understanding spring from 
differences in worldview, and thus differences in background (gen-
der, sexuality, race, and/or culture).
89
  When the decision-maker—in 
this case a judge—is so dominated by one race and one gender, it 
begs the question of how his view of the law and what he deems ob-
jective may differ from people who are differently situated.  At least 
one study has shown that this difference in viewpoint cuts across gen-
der, race, and class lines.
90
  Given that the make-up of the judiciary is 
significantly dominated by one gender, race, and class, it should not 
 
 88 Moreover, there is support for the argument that the “unconscious discrimina-
tion infecting American society infects its judiciary as well.”  Wendy Parker, Lessons in 
Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 940 (2006) (cit-
ing Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555, 561–62 (2001)).   
 89 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2082 
(footnotes omitted).  Scheppele explained, 
Social theorists have long known that people differently situated in the 
social world come to see events in quite distinct and distinctive ways.  
How people interpret what they see (or what people see in the first 
place) depends to a very large extent on prior experiences, on the ways 
in which people have organized their own sense-making and observa-
tion, on the patterns that have emerged in the past for them as mean-
ingful in living daily life.  And so it should not be surprising that people 
with systematically different sorts of experiences should come to see 
the world in systematically different ways. 
Id. 
 90 Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Il-liberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 879 (2009).  The authors noted,  
Individuals (particularly white males) who hold hierarchical and indi-
vidualist cultural worldviews, who are politically conservative, who are 
affluent, and who reside in the West were likely to form significantly 
more pro-defendant risk-perceptions.  Individuals who hold egalitarian 
and communitarian views, whose politics are liberal, who are well edu-
cated but likely less affluent, and whose ranks include disproportion-
ately more African Americans and women, in contrast, were significant-
ly more likely to form pro-plaintiff views . . . .  
Id. 
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come as a surprise that judges may have different ideas about legal 
concepts like reasonableness—different at least from individuals who 
are not white, male, and affluent.  However, we often refuse to 
acknowledge this uncertainty in order to hold on to some semblance 
of objectivity in the law.  There is a real fear of sacrificing a common 
thread of agreement regarding basic legal concepts like reasonable-
ness for a multi-layered view that is less predictable.  Yet, that fear 
does not change the stark reality that any confidence in the objectivi-
ty of such legal concepts is a false one.
91
  
 Once the notion that there is no such thing as objectivity is ac-
cepted, it still leaves a plaintiff with the reality that she must appeal 
to, and perhaps even change, the judge’s perception of her and her 
claim.  Gerald Lopez has addressed this issue by explaining that hu-
man beings see the world through “stock stories,” by which he means 
the stories “that help us interpret the everyday world with limited in-
formation and help us make choices about asserting our own needs 
and responding to other people.”
92
  These stories form the basis of 
the judge’s understanding of the world.  Thus, when a plaintiff’s legal 
claim requires a modification of one of those “stock stories,” she has a 
very difficult task.
93
  This is especially true when her chances at com-
municating her narrative are so sparse and limited to a piecemeal 
paper record. 
Compounding this problem of communicating her narrative is 
that the loss of a trial means the loss of an opportunity to tell her sto-
ry to a jury of her peers.  In essence, the plaintiff has one shot at con-
vincing the judge of the validity of her claim, instead of the multiple 
appeals that she may be able to make to a multi-person jury.  This has 
an impact on the litigation of innovative claims because the chances 
of changing one homogenous arbiter’s view of the world, as opposed 
to a subset of some number of heterogeneous arbiters’ views of the 
world, are significantly lower.  Moreover, in a jury trial, the members 
 
 91 Khan, Hoffman and Braman also note: 
Social psychology teaches us that our perceptions of fact are pervasively 
shaped by our commitments to shared but contested views of individual 
virtue and social justice.  It also tells us that although our ability to per-
ceive this type of value-motivated cognition in others is quite acute, our 
power to perceive it in ourselves tends to be quite poor. 
Id. at 842–43.   
 92 Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).   
 93 Id.  “To solve a problem through persuasion of another we therefore must un-
derstand and manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell a 
plausible and compelling story—one that moves that person to grant the remedy we 
want.”  Id.  
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of the jury are required to interact with one another and engage in a 
discussion of what the plaintiff is alleging.  This means that they 
reach a consensus, one that is better because of all the minds that 
went into crafting the conclusion.
94
  With a motion for summary 
judgment, a judge may discuss the issues with her clerks, but this is 
hardly the kind of deliberation and engagement that takes place in a 
jury room.  Instead, it is a much more isolated experience.  Thus, the 
lack of a jury trial means that the heterogeneous members of our 
populace—those who might serve on a jury—do not see or sit in 
judgment of the evidence that might be probative of a plaintiff’s 
case.
95
 
However, the mere fact that a plaintiff is a woman or a person of 
color does not necessarily mean that she is a vanishing plaintiff.  The-
se characteristics are interactive, and the interaction depends on the 
substantive aspects of her case as well as the procedural doctrine ap-
plied.  For example, assume that a woman brought an employment 
discrimination claim based on gender forty years ago.  Further as-
sume that she had a company document stating that she was fired be-
cause of her gender.  Her claim would have been novel at that time, 
and if a procedural rule was restrictively applied to her, she might 
have been considered a vanishing plaintiff.  That same woman today 
may not be considered as such.  The evidence presented and the 
claim are not outside of our societal understanding of discrimination.  
Most people would (hopefully) agree that a company should not be 
able to fire a person just because she is a woman.  In that sense, a 
woman making such a claim would not be a vanishing plaintiff.  
However, a woman making a discrimination claim today without a 
“smoking-gun” memo—a claim in which there must be an under-
standing of institutionalized sexism and how it works within a corpo-
rate context—will have a much harder time with her claim.
96
  The 
conflicting narratives of her experience and how the company viewed 
her performance will lead to different interpretations of the events 
giving rise to her termination.  As discrimination becomes more sub-
conscious and less de facto, our societal understanding of something 
 
 94 See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 81, at 402.   
 95 There are, of course, problems with jury selection, and it must be acknowl-
edged that a jury will not necessarily be reflective of the plaintiff’s characteristics.  
However, there is greater probability of diversity on a jury than there is in the current 
state of the federal judiciary.   
 96 See generally Selmi, supra note 88(arguing that employment discrimination cases 
are hard to win because society has a misperception that employment suits are frivo-
lous and because judges deciding the cases have an implicit bias against the claims).   
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like sexism is not collective.  In other words, we do not necessarily 
agree about what is discrimination and what is not. 
Thus, the farther an individual’s claim locates the individual out-
side of societal understanding of her characteristics, the more likely 
she is to become a vanishing plaintiff.  Consequently, an individual 
who might otherwise be considered part of the dominant, main-
stream culture might still be a vanishing plaintiff if the nature of her 
claim is culturally peripheral.   For example, where a man brings a 
hostile work environment claim on the basis of a female supervisor’s 
advances, he may be a vanishing plaintiff.
97
  Such a story does not fit 
within dominant views of how sexual harassment emerges in typical 
gender relations, and he will confront many difficulties in pursuing 
his claim.  This shows that even where a person by virtue of his gen-
der might have been considered part of the mainstream, his experi-
ences and legal claims may instead make him an outsider, which 
means that anyone, depending on the interaction of their character-
istics and claims and the impact of that combination on their narra-
tive ability, may become a vanishing plaintiff. 
C. Social Benefit of Vanishing Plaintiff Claims 
Knowing the characteristics of the vanishing plaintiff is not 
enough to justify a retreat from a restrictive procedural regime.  What 
is critical to know is whether her claims—if successful—would some-
how benefit society.  In short, they would.  Vanishing plaintiffs’ claims 
serve two important social functions.  First, they create or reinforce 
path-breaking laws.  Second, they provide a primary, if not sole, mode 
of enforcement.  There is much to be lost by not allowing vanishing 
plaintiffs’ claims into the system.  There are advantages from airing 
these claims in a public forum, and these advantages stretch well be-
yond a plaintiff’s potential victory. 
First, vanishing plaintiffs’ claims have historically created path-
breaking laws.  Those who are outside of dominant, mainstream cate-
gories are often politically powerless, and that lack of power translates 
into a lack of ability to pursue legislative change.
98
  Moreover, even 
 
 97 See, e.g., Hosey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. AW–95–196, 1996 WL 414057, at *2 
(D. Md. May 17, 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir. 1997) (granting summary 
judgment in defendant’s favor by determining that such advances by his young fe-
male supervisor—which included telling the plaintiff that “she would like to know 
what it felt like to have [him] inside her” and pinching him—did not amount to a 
hostile work environment and were instead just “teenagers . . . asking each other for 
dates.”).  For a more complete summary of Hosey as well as a host of other relevant 
cases, see Beiner, supra note 85, at 103–19.   
 98 See Yamamoto, supra note 58, at 426.   
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when such legislative change is achieved, repeated litigation to rein-
force that change is critical.
99
  The civil justice system is still a viable 
vehicle for the pursuit of social change for those who are on the out-
side.
100
  Moreover, vanishing plaintiff claims reinforce and push the 
development of path-breaking laws.  For example, while discrimina-
tion laws are arguably the product of society’s judgment about how 
we should treat one another,
101
 they certainly do not represent a uni-
versal agreement about that treatment.  Through litigation, the pub-
lic is able to witness what marginalized individuals experience, and 
that witnessing leads to a very public discussion about what is right 
and what is wrong.  However, when discrimination claims are not 
brought or when they are resolved in a non-public way, society loses 
the benefit of this public dialogue.
102
  Thus, the procedures that gov-
ern litigation within our political system should be sensitive to the 
important function that the courts serve—that is, to provide a forum 
 
 99 Where a person finds herself so far outside of dominant societal views, it is im-
portant to have a public forum where multiple claims by similarly situated plaintiffs 
can be repeatedly pursued.  See generally Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 63–65 (2003). 
 100 Yamamoto, supra note 58, at 426.  As Yamamoto explains, “[R]epeated asser-
tions of rights through litigation can help focus issues by compelling formal public 
statements of justification by those with decision-making power.”  Id. at 412.  Moreo-
ver, greater frequency of vanishing-plaintiff claims develops the law, taking those 
claims away from cases of “first impression” to cases where the law is deeply thought 
about and debated.  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 37, at 1002–03 (explaining that in 
consumer discrimination claims, the frequency of pretrial dismissals “hinders the 
growth and development of [§] 1981 to address these claims”).  In other words, liti-
gation develops rules and precedents that guide behavior, and this provides courts 
with a better set of standards with which to judge claims.  See David Luban, Settlements 
and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995).  Such public litiga-
tion also assures that these rules and precedents will be digested by society as a 
whole.  Id.    
 101 This is a gross over-simplification of the purpose and effect of anti-
discrimination laws.  For a more detailed treatment and critique of this subject, see 
generally Allan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, in THE POLITICS 
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 121–50 (David Kairys ed., 1990); Reva Siegel, Why 
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997). 
 102 Hadfield, supra note 34, at 1285.  Hadfield stated, 
The substantial growth in civil rights litigation . . . reflects significant 
statutory changes over the last three decades: litigants in this category 
are showing up in federal court much more frequently because that is 
what the democratic process seceded should happen.  These are clearly 
the cases in which the concerns raised by critics of ADR, about the loss 
of public adjudication and the expression of public values, are poten-
tially powerful.  
Id. at 1290. 
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for individuals whose only access point into the public sphere may 
very well be the courts.
103
 
Second, vanishing-plaintiff claims serve a regulatory function.  
Many laws require private enforcement, and vanishing plaintiffs often 
take on that role; therefore, when claims by vanishing plaintiffs are 
effectively barred by a restrictive procedural regime, the benefit of 
that private enforcement is lost.
104
  In recent history, federal and state 
governments have exercised less oversight over organizations.
105
  One 
need only read recent headlines about individuals like Bernard 
Madoff and organizations like British Petroleum to see that the result 
of this laissez-faire approach is not always best for individuals or socie-
ty.
106
  In this way, private civil litigation serves an enforcement func-
tion by forcing organizations to abide by existing laws and social mo-
res.
107
  When vanishing plaintiffs’ claims are lost, however, this critical 
benefit is largely sacrificed. 
The Regents of the University of California v. Bakke provides a perti-
nent example of how this benefit might be lost.
108
  Bakke is standard 
fare in law school constitutional law classes across the country.  Its 
core holding, that quotas in school admissions’ policies were uncon-
 
 103 See Yamamoto, supra note 58, at 429 (“A procedural system hospitable to mi-
nority claims at the margins facilitates not only the articulation of old rights in new 
contexts.  It also facilitates the development of group power by encouraging the ar-
ticulation and advocacy of new conceptions of rights responsive to the needs and as-
pirations of people unrecognized by the Constitution’s framers and ignored by socie-
ty’s mainstream.”). 
 104 See Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private At-
torney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 353, 397 (1988) (asserting that the private attorney general idea “celebrates the 
power of attorneys to do good, to overcome structural obstacles to the vindication of 
legal rights, and therefore to bring justice to those who may be priced out of the 
market”).   
 105 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2520 (2008) (“Although class actions spark controversy, no 
one denies that a quiet government trend to privatize various regulatory aspects for 
the public good has been occurring for a while now.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Binyan Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Ignored Credible Tips 
About Madoff, Chief Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2008, at D1; Ian Urbina, Documents 
Show Earlier Fears About Safety of Offshore Well, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at A1.   
 107 Judge Jerome Frank referred to the function of a private individual enforcing a 
public law as an action by a “private attorney general.”  See Associated Indus. of N.Y. 
State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot 320 U.S. 707 
(1943) (“Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.”).  
But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 229 (1983) (arguing that 
perverse incentives have undermined some of the benefits that a private attorney 
general might create).   
 108 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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stitutional, but that race may generally be a consideration in such pol-
icies, gave rise to a slew of affirmative action cases.
109
  Yet, if Bakke 
brought his case today, there is a good chance that his complaint 
would have been dismissed for failure to state a claim.  His sparse 
complaint stated that he had not been admitted to medical school 
because other applicants had been admitted under a “special admis-
sion[]” process that used “separate standards.”
110
  Bakke even had 
some facts to back up these statements—an account that sixteen of 
the one hundred applicants admitted were from this “separate” 
pool.
111
  However, Bakke’s claim of discrimination would have ulti-
mately required him to prove that he was an otherwise qualified ap-
plicant for admission to medical school.  On that count, Bakke’s 
complaint stated an arguably conclusory allegation—he claimed that 
he was a “qualified” applicant without providing facts to make that a 
plausible claim.
112
 
Given this unsupported conclusory allegation, if a court today 
were reviewing this complaint, it might very well dismiss it under Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
113
 and Iqbal.  A court may have determined 
that Bakke had not stated a plausible claim because he had nothing 
but a bare allegation of his qualifications as a medical school candi-
date.  Thus, regardless of whether there was a separate race-based 
admissions standard, Bakke himself had not suffered discrimination.  
A more plausible story is that he simply did not qualify under the 
medical school’s standards for admission. 
Yet, when this case was brought in 1974, the defendants did not 
even file a motion to dismiss.  Discovery proceeded; the trial court 
heard the case and determined that the admissions process was un-
constitutional.
114
  On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this finding 
 
 109 Harvery Gee, Book Review, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 277, 280–81 (2001) (review-
ing HOWARD BELL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
(2000)).  
 110 ALLAN BAKKE VERSUS REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 4–5 (Alfred A. 
Slocum ed., 1978). 
 111 Id. at 4.   
 112 Id.  For a more detailed discussion of this analysis, see Coleman, supra note 4. 
 113 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 114 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1978).  It should be 
noted that the medical school actually stipulated that Bakke would have been admit-
ted were it not for its special admissions policy.  Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke:  An 
Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 GEO. L. J. 981, 981 (1999).  The school did so in or-
der to more quickly resolve whether its admissions policy was constitutional.  Id.  Un-
der Conley, a motion to dismiss on this issue would have certainly been denied.  How-
ever, had this case been brought after Twombly and Iqbal, there is an argument that 
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and laid the groundwork for a long line of cases regarding the con-
sideration of race in admissions processes.
115
 
Bakke was an individual whose claim put him outside of social 
norms—as a white male, he brought a case based on a claim of dis-
crimination.  What is now commonly referred to as reverse discrimi-
nation was not so easily articulated, at least in a legal sense, in the 
1970s.  Moreover, Bakke hired a solo practitioner, Reynold H. Colvin, 
who was a well-respected lawyer, but hardly a high-priced member of 
an international law firm.
116
  In this way, Bakke was, by this Article’s 
definition, a vanishing plaintiff: his claim presented a narrative chal-
lenge and he did not have the economic resources necessary to access 
high-priced legal services.  Nonetheless, Bakke was able to bring his 
case, be fully heard, and succeed. 
And, while reasonable minds can differ as to the relative merits 
of his substantive claim, the bottom line is that Bakke’s claim pushed 
the development of path-breaking legal doctrine (consideration of 
race in admissions policies), and it served a regulatory function that 
was not otherwise being provided (filling out the bounds of Title VI 
and the equal protection clause).  Thus, Bakke had a strong social 
benefit.  First, it helped the public become aware of the issues Bakke 
alleged he was facing, and individual members of our society, wheth-
er they agreed or disagreed with him, were able to see his case play 
out.
117
  Moreover, because the case did not even confront a motion to 
dismiss, it was publicly aired and discrimination law was propelled in 
a different direction.  Finally, for that time, the law was enforced; 
thus, the regulatory benefit of his claim was felt. 
If Bakke brought his case today, however, it would likely fail ei-
ther because his case would be dismissed under Twombly and Iqbal or 
because a lawyer would not even be willing to take his case in the first 
instance (based on an assessment of that probable procedural fail-
ure).  More critically, no one other than Bakke or someone just like 
him could bring such a claim.  In other words, there would be no oth-
er claim, party, or mechanism that could fill the role that a plaintiff 
like Bakke played.  As a result, the social benefits of his claim would 
be completely lost under today’s regime.  It is because of the import 
of these benefits—the ones previously fulfilled by plaintiffs like 
 
the school might not have made such an early concession on that issue.  Coleman, 
supra note 4, at 1159–60.   
 115 Id. at 310.   
 116 See Gee, supra note 109, at 286–87.   
 117 See Kennedy, supra note 37, at 1011.   
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Bakke—that the Court, Congress, and rulemakers must take heed of 
the plaintiffs who are vanishing before our very eyes. 
IV. RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURAL CHANGES APPLIED 
Having both defined the vanishing plaintiff and explained the 
import of her claims to our society, the discussion proceeds to 
demonstrate how particular procedural rules and doctrines—ones in 
which recent changes have led to more restrictive application—affect 
the vanishing plaintiff differently from other plaintiffs.  Two specific 
examples of changes to procedural doctrine that were guided by a re-
strictive ethos—pleading and summary judgment—will be ad-
dressed.
118
 
A. Pleading: Twombly & Iqbal 
The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a 
claim has been the subject of great debate for the last three years.  
The attention paid is due to two critical Supreme Court cases—
Twombly and Iqbal.  For the fifty years preceding Twombly, the standard 
for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was thought to be well settled.  Under 
Conley v. Gibson, the Court stated that “a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.”
119
  However, in Twombly, the Court “re-
tired” this language, and held that in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss, a plaintiff’s claim must be plausible.
120
  In Twombly, the plain-
tiffs, a group of local telecommunication companies, alleged that the 
Baby Bell telephone companies tacitly agreed not to compete in or-
der to keep monopolies in their respective regions.
121
  The effect of 
this conspiracy, the plaintiffs alleged, was to prevent them from effec-
tively competing in those same markets.
122
  The Court determined 
that the complaint was rightly dismissed because the bare allegation 
of parallel conduct by the telephone companies was not enough to 
show that the companies conspired.
123
  The plaintiffs needed to state 
facts that would make the claim of conspiracy plausible.
124
  The Court 
 
 118 For additional examples of restrictive procedural changes that have differently 
affected the vanishing plaintiff, see discussion infra note 227.  
 119 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (emphasis added).   
 120 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 
 121 Id. at 551. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 564–66. 
 124 Id. 
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expressed concern about meritless cases, and it rejected the argu-
ment that judges could effectively manage discovery to prevent de-
fendants from needlessly settling a case—the fear being that the high 
costs of discovery often coerce innocent defendants into settling.
125
  
Instead, the plaintiff must state a plausible claim at the outset; if she 
does not, then her complaint must be dismissed. 
At first, some commentators believed that Twombly, while an im-
portant case, was one that could potentially be limited to its antitrust 
facts.
126
  That hopeful speculation proved wrong, however, once Iqbal 
was handed down.
127
  In Iqbal, the plaintiff alleged that he had been 
discriminated against by virtue of his arrest and detention following 
September 11th.
128
  More specifically, he alleged that then-Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and then-FBI Director Robert Mueller created 
and implemented a policy of discriminating against people on the 
basis of religion, race, and/or national origin in response to the ter-
rorist attacks.
129
 
The Court found that Iqbal’s complaint against Ashcroft and 
Mueller should have been dismissed because the allegations, while 
possible, did not contain enough facts to make them plausible.
130
  The 
Court held that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable in-
ference the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
131
  Thus, a 
court reviewing a motion to dismiss must eschew all “mere conclusory 
statements” and then review the remaining “factual content” to “de-
termine whether [it] plausibly give[s] rise to an entitlement to re-
lief.”
132
  The determination of what might be reasonable inferences 
and what might be a plausible claim was, according to the Court, “a 
context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense.”
133
  Finally, the Court clari-
fied that the plausibility standard for motions to dismiss was trans-
 
 125 Id. at 558–60. 
 126 See, e.g., J. Douglas Richards, Three Limitations of Twombly: Antitrust Conspiracy 
Inferences in a Context of Historical Monopoly, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 852 (2008). 
 127 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 128 Id. at 1942.   
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 1950. 
 131 Id. at 1949. 
 132 Id. at 1949–50. 
 133 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
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substantive—the test was not limited to antitrust cases, but was appli-
cable to all cases in federal court.
134
 
Many commentators believe that Twombly and Iqbal are monu-
mental cases, significantly changing existing precedent regarding 
motions to dismiss.
135
  What troubles most commentators about 
Twombly and Iqbal is that in some cases, the plausibility standard re-
quires the plaintiff to plead more than she can possibly know.
136
  In 
other words, in particular substantive areas, there is an inherent in-
formation asymmetry between what the plaintiff knows (and must 
eventually prove in order to win her case) and what the defendant 
knows (and will end up producing through properly-conducted dis-
covery).  Under Iqbal, the plaintiff is required to plead these exact 
 
 134 Id. at 1953. 
 135 Since Iqbal, some members of Congress have proposed legislation to re-instate 
the Conley standard, some scholars have advocated for Iqbal’s repeal, and many have 
called for the rulemaking committee to amend the federal rules in an effort to soften 
the effect of the cases.  See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th 
Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (“A court shall not dismiss a complaint under [Rule 12] unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the 
claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.  A court shall not dismiss a complaint 
. . . on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the com-
plaint do not show the plaintiff’s claim to be plausible . . . .” (emphasis added)); No-
tice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (“Except as 
otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of enactment of this 
Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).”).  Thus 
far, neither Congress nor the rulemaking committee has taken steps to change 
Twombly and Iqbal; instead, the rulemaking committee has explicitly adopted a “wait-
and-see” approach to the cases.  See Memorandum from the Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, 
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, 
Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure for Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee 91 (2010) [hereainfter Kravitz Memorandum], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2010.pdf.  
 136 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking:  Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L. J. 597, 654 (2010) (arguing that the new pleading standards 
will make private antitrust cases harder to bring because, to be successful, the “plain-
tiff must learn what the defendant alone may know,” but no longer can because her 
complaint will be dismissed before discovery); Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State 
Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43, 52 (2010) (arguing that in some cases, 
the facts necessary to pass the pleading threshold set forth in Twombly and Iqbal “may 
be solely in the hands of the defendants or hostile third parties,” which will necessi-
tate discovery); Suzette Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting:  How Pre-Dismissal 
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 65, 87–88 (2010) (arguing that civil rights claims are more vulnerable 
under Twombly and Iqbal because plaintiffs must allege intentional conduct—conduct 
that is often “consistent with both legal and illegal behavior” such that it cannot be 
confirmed at the pleading stage but that must instead be proven through facts found 
in discovery).   
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facts—the ones that make her claim seem plausible to a judge—
before any discovery is conducted.  However, without the opportunity 
to conduct discovery on the basis of pure notice pleading, the plain-
tiff cannot know these facts and must either forego that particular 
claim or, in some cases, give up her entire case.
137
  Her other alterna-
tive is to spend untold numbers of hours and dollars on a pre-filing 
investigation so that she can obtain the facts necessary to state a plau-
sible claim under Iqbal.
138
  But even then, it is not clear that such an 
investigation would lead her to the facts that she might have other-
wise obtained in discovery.
139
 
Though the data is limited, it appears that Twombly and Iqbal are 
having a significant impact on the frequency and outcome of motions 
to dismiss.  In a recent study, Professor Patricia Hatamyar found that 
the number of motions to dismiss that are granted has increased 
from forty-six percent under Conley to forty-eight percent under 
Twombly and, ultimately, to sixty-one percent under Iqbal.
140
  Moreo-
 
 137 See Scott Dodson, supra note 136, at 52–53.  Dodson explains,  
Some facts may be solely in the hands of the defendants or hostile third 
parties.  Certain claims, especially those hinging on the defendant’s 
state of mind or secretive conduct, are particularly susceptible to that 
kind of “information asymmetry.”  Civil rights and discrimination 
claims, corporate wrongdoing, unlawful conspiracies, and intentional 
torts are all good examples. 
Id. at 52 (citations omitted).  For those plaintiffs who cannot find this information 
before filing, their potentially meritorious claims will be dismissed.  Id. at 53.   
 138 See Malveaux, supra note 136, at 89–90(discussing difficulties in presenting 
plaintiff’s case in light of plausibility standard).   Rule 11(b)(3) requires that the 
plaintiff conduct an “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” before filing her 
case, FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3),  but such an inquiry may still not unearth the facts now 
required to be plead under Iqbal.  For example, if a plaintiff is beaten by a police of-
ficer and wants to file a § 1983 claim, she may not be able to determine—even after 
an exhaustive inquiry—the identity of her assailant.   
 139 See Malveaux, supra note 136, at 89 (arguing that evidence of civil rights viola-
tions is often difficult to find before discovery because “evidence of illegal motive (in-
tent) or institutional practices is often difficult to unearth absent discovery”).  
Malveaux proposes that courts should allow for pre-dismissal discovery in cases where 
there may be an asymmetry of information.  Id. at 106–08; see also Dodson, supra note 
136, at 52. 
 140 Patricia Hatamyar, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) 
Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 613 tbl.1, 614(2012) [hereinafter Hatamyar, Quanti-
tative Study].   Hatamyar concluded that these increases are statistically significant.  
Id. at 621.  Moreover, these numbers track closely an earlier study conducted by 
Hatamyar.  Patricia Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Em-
pirically?, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 601–02 (2010) [hereinafter Hatamyar, Tao of Plead-
ing] (measuring the same increases from forty-six to forty-eight to fifty-six percent, 
respectively); see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2011), available at 
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ver, this increase has affected particular kinds of claims more pro-
foundly than others.  According to an ongoing study by the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts, the number of motions to dismiss grant-
ed in civil rights employment cases has increased from fifteen to 
sixteen percent under Twombly and Iqbal.
141
  For all other civil rights 
cases, the rate of granted motions to dismiss increased from twenty to 
twenty-five percent.
142
  Similarly, in Hatamyar’s study, she found that 
in constitutional civil rights cases the rate increased from forty-one 
percent under Conley to sixty-four percent under Iqbal.
143
 
The effect of Twombly and Iqbal is especially debilitating to a van-
ishing plaintiff because she will not have the resources necessary to 
find the required “factual content” in advance of filing her com-
plaint.  First, she may not be able to hire a lawyer at all.  That may be 
because of her low economic status, but it will often be because, given 
the small chance of success for her claim both procedurally and sub-
 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.  
The Federal Judicial Center Study (FJC) found that, in its statistical sample, there was 
little or no increase in grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend in civil 
rights and employment discrimination cases.  CECIL ET AL., supra, at 14.  However, the 
granting of motions to dismiss with leave to amend in civil rights cases increased from 
21.1% to 32.8%, and in employment discrimination cases increased from 17.9% to 
23.5%.  Id.  As discussed in this Part, there is often an information disparity between 
the plaintiff and defendant such that even with leave to amend, the pleading cannot 
be cured.  In addition, the FJC study determined that its findings regarding the in-
creased dismissal activity under Twombly and Iqbal were statistically insignificant, save 
its findings regarding financial instruments.  Id. at 21.  However, at least one scholar 
has questioned the impact of this determination by noting that statistical insignifi-
cance does not mean that Twombly and Iqbal had no effect, nor does it mean that the 
study can completely measure all the effects of the cases, including the chilling ef-
fect.  Lonny Hoffmann, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judi-
cial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2012), available at  
http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2010/Hoffman.pdf.  For a response from 
the FJC to Hoffmann and others’ critique of this study, see Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and 
Water:  A Response to Comments on the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss for Failure to 
State a Claim After Iqbal (March 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026103.  Cecil’s response 
notes that the FJC, in response to a request from the Standing Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, is proposing a new “comprehensive and 
collaborative” study examining the effect of dispositive motions, including the mo-
tion to dismiss and summary judgment.  Id. at 49.   
 141 See Kravitz Memorandum, supra note 135, at 90–91.  
 142 Id.     
 143 Hatamyar, Quantitative Study, supra note 140, at 12; see also Hatamyar, Tao of 
Pleading, supra note 140, at 606–07 (finding that the dismissal rate increased from 
fifty to fifty-eight percent under Iqbal).  Hatamyar notes that many of these dismissals 
are granted with leave to amend. Hatamyar, Tao of Pleading, supra note 140, at  607.  
Yet, as discussed in this Article, it is not clear that the vanishing plaintiff would be 
able to come up with the facts necessary to survive an additional motion to dismiss 
even if she were able to amend her complaint.   
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stantively, a lawyer will be unwilling to take her case.  As discussed in 
Part III.A, plaintiffs generally hire solo practitioners, and their finan-
cial calculus for taking cases is very different from that of large law 
firms representing organizations.  Moreover, even if a vanishing 
plaintiff can hire a lawyer, that lawyer is likely to be financially 
and/or intellectually ill-equipped to deal with a restrictive procedur-
al regime, especially procedures like plausibility pleading under 
Twombly and Iqbal. 
For example, in Young v. Visalia, the district court judge dis-
missed plaintiffs’ Monell-liability claims against the City of Visalia.144  In 
that case, fourteen defendant police officers allegedly knowingly exe-
cuted a search warrant on a property that was not named on the war-
rant, detained the plaintiff at gunpoint for over five hours, and with-
held fluids, bathroom facilities, and his medication.
145
  Plaintiffs 
brought § 1983 and other state law claims against the individual de-
fendants, but they also brought a claim for municipal liability against 
the City of Visalia.
146
  In order to state that claim, plaintiffs had to al-
lege a “policy or custom” that led to the violation.
147
  More specifical-
ly, plaintiffs had to show that Visalia’s failure to train its employees 
“amounted to a deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] rights 
of the persons with whom [its police officers] are likely to come into 
contact.”
148
  Deliberate indifference in this context means more than 
just an officer making a mistake—there has to be a pattern of con-
duct to which the municipality fails to respond.
149
  Here, the court de-
termined that plaintiffs did not state a plausible claim for municipal 
liability. 
First, the court rejected prior Ninth Circuit precedent, which 
had held that in the Monell context “a claim . . . is sufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more 
than a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct con-
formed to official policy, custom, or practice.”
150
  Following Iqbal, the 
 
 144 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1150 (2009).   
 145 Id. at 1144. 
 146 Id. at 1144, 1146. 
 147 Id. at 1147.  Municipalities cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat 
superior.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.  They can only be liable where “execution of a gov-
ernment’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts 
or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy” causes the constitutional viola-
tion to occur.  Id. at 694.   
 148 Young, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations 
in original).   
 149 Id.   
 150 Id. at 1149 (quoting Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007)).   
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Young court determined, “the Ninth Circuit pleading standard for 
Monell claims (i.e., bare allegations) is no longer viable.”
151
  Next, ap-
plying Iqbal to Young, the court found that plaintiffs made only 
“threadbare” allegations of “inadequate training and hiring practic-
es.”
152
  The court noted that the complaint did “not identify what the 
training and hiring practices were, how the training and hiring prac-
tices were deficient, or how the training and hiring practices caused 
[p]laintiffs’ harm.”
153
  Yet, it is unclear how the plaintiffs could have 
obtained this kind of information before discovery.  Presumably, the 
training and hiring practices of the city’s police department were not 
well known, and even if documents like manuals and training materi-
als were available, they may not have reflected the reality of the train-
ing officers received.  Before Iqbal, the court all but admitted that this 
claim would have survived a motion to dismiss, but in the wake of 
Iqbal, a claim like this is no longer viable, even if the claim has mer-
it.
154
 
 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id.  
 153 Id.   
 154 Young, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.  Other courts have noted the same.  As the data 
discussed above shows, cases that would have survived a motion to dismiss under Con-
ley are not surviving under Twombly and Iqbal.  See, e.g., Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-
Burset, 639 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D.P.R. 2009), vacated in part, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011).  
The Ocasio-Hernandez court stated: 
The court notes that its present ruling, although draconianly harsh to 
say the least, is mandated by the recent Iqbal decision construing Rules 
8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).  The original complaint [] filed before Iqbal was 
decided by the Supreme Court, as well as the Amended Complaint [], 
clearly met the pre-Iqbal pleading standard under Rule 8.  As a matter 
of fact, counsel for defendants, experienced beyond cavil in political 
discrimination litigation, did not file a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
original complaint because the same was properly pleaded under the 
then existing, pre-Iqbal standard. . . .  As evidenced by this opinion, 
even highly experienced counsel will henceforth find it extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to plead a section 1983 political discrimination 
suit without ‘smoking gun’ evidence.  In the past, a plaintiff could file a 
complaint such as that in this case, and through discovery obtain the 
direct and/or circumstantial evidence needed to sustain the First 
Amendment allegations. If the evidence was lacking, a case would then 
be summarily disposed of. This no longer being the case, counsel in 
political discrimination cases will now be forced to file suit in Com-
monwealth court, where Iqbal does not apply and post-complaint dis-
covery is, thus, available. Counsel will also likely only raise local law 
claims to avoid removal to federal court where Iqbal will sound the 
death knell. Certainly, such a chilling effect was not intended by Con-
gress when it enacted Section 1983. 
Id. at 226 n.4.   
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The same is true in another sample case, Acosta Orellana v. 
CropLife International
155
  In that case, a group of plaintiffs including 
crop-dusting pilots and banana plantation workers brought a suit 
against a number of fungicide producers and two industry groups, 
CropLife International and CropLife America (together, the 
“CropLife defendants”).
156
  Plaintiffs alleged that Mancozeb, a fungi-
cide that was used to treat bananas in Ecuador, was toxic for humans 
and unlawful.
157
  While defendants promoted Mancozeb as non-toxic 
and “green,” plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knowingly mislead 
the public in Ecuador in order to sell greater amounts of this prod-
uct.
158
  The plaintiffs made multiple claims against the CropLife de-
fendants.
159
  Two of their most promising claims—negligent supervi-
sion and claims based on vicarious liability—were rejected by the 
court essentially because it determined that plaintiffs had not pled 
facts sufficient to show the corporate relationship between the enti-
ties.
160
 
For example, one of the plaintiffs’ theories of vicarious liability 
was that the CropLife defendants controlled CropLife Ecuador and 
“used CropLife Ecuador to initiate a campaign to falsely promote 
Mancozeb as a ‘green’ product . . . despite its known health haz-
ards.”
161
  The court determined that this theory failed under Twombly 
and Iqbal because the argument that CropLife Ecuador was under the 
complete control of the CropLife defendants “[was] completely 
conclusory and lacking the necessary factual support to survive dis-
missal.”
162
  The plaintiffs’ complaint included facts stating that the 
CropLife representative in Ecuador was “aggressively promot[ing] 
the use of Mancozeb and its ‘green’ designation,” as well as facts indi-
cating that subsidiaries of the CropLife defendants in Ecuador “were 
assisting CropLife Ecuador in promoting the use of Mancozeb.”
163
  
Yet, the court rejected the inference that the CropLife defendants 
controlled CropLife Ecuador.
164
 
 
 155 711 F. Supp. 2d. 81 (D.D.C. 2010).   
 156 Id. at 85–86.   
 157 Id. at 86. 
 158 Id. at 87. 
 159 Id. at 90–115. 
 160 Id. at 88, 103 n.24, 110–13.   
 161 Acosta Orellana, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 111.    
 162 Id.  
 163 Id.   
 164 Id.   
COLEMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  5:51 PM 
2012] THE VANISHING PLAINTIFF 539 
Again, like Young, additional facts that might have indicated the 
relationship between the various CropLife entities were unlikely to be 
easily available to plaintiffs.  The entities are a complex network of 
trade associations, counting as members a number of incredibly pow-
erful corporations like Monsanto and BASF.
165
  The corporate struc-
ture and relationships of the different CropLife entities and their 
members are not easy to decipher, and the facts pled by the plaintiffs 
in this case arguably indicated that there was a relationship—one in 
which some of the entities controlled the activities of the entities in 
Ecuador.  Yet the court, using Twombly and Iqbal, prevented the plain-
tiffs from moving forward on its vicarious liability theories because of 
their inability to plead more definitive facts that would make this 
claim plausible in the court’s mind. 
The substantive claims in Young and Acosta Orellana are very dif-
ferent; yet, the procedural problem in both cases is the same.  The 
plaintiffs did not have the facts now required under Twombly and 
Iqbal.  Further, the facts these plaintiffs needed were in the province 
of the defendants, so the plaintiffs were unlikely to garner those facts 
without discovery.  Finally, and key to how a restrictive approach to 
pleading impacts vanishing plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in both cases were 
represented by small firms.
166
  Assuming the lawyers were familiar with 
the federal doctrine and astute at assessing it, they were probably un-
able to expend the money necessary to do the pre-filing investigation 
that the pleading rules now require.  For example, the solo practi-
tioner who represented the plaintiff in Young may not have had the 
funds to investigate the City of Visalia’s training practices.  The same 
is true for the lawyers in Acosta Orellana who were unlikely to have the 
resources to expend on determining CropLife’s complex corporate 
structure.  Thus, even a plaintiff with enough resources to hire an at-
torney will often be unable to hire an attorney that is good enough to 
take on a restrictive procedural regime. 
Finally, the critical question is what the social cost of losing cases 
like Young and Acosta Orellana on a motion to dismiss would be.  If 
there is a systemic benefit, but also significant social costs when these 
cases are dismissed prematurely, then perhaps the move toward a re-
 
 165 See Members, CROPLIFE INT’L, www.croplife.org/public/our_members (last visit-
ed Feb. 17, 2012). 
 166 The Acosta Orrellana plaintiffs were represented by Conrad & Scherer, LLP,  
http://www.conradscherer.com/firm_profile.asp.  See Acosta Orrellana, 711 F. Supp. 
2d at 85.  The Young plaintiffs were represented by James C. Holland Jr., who was a 
sole practitioner at the time of this case, but is now a member of a small firm, Wist 
Holland & Kehlhof, L.L.P. (http://pview.findlaw.com/view/1689443_1).  See Young 
v. Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1143 (2009).  
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strictive ethos should be reconsidered.  With respect to these two cas-
es, society has much to lose.  In Young, premature dismissal means 
that laws intended to regulate the behavior of police officers are not 
enforced.  The City of Visalia never has to define and defend its train-
ing policies and practices.  And, with a pleading regime that now 
makes Monell claims incredibly difficult to bring, nationwide govern-
ment officials’ behavior will be largely unregulated.  Similarly, the 
loss of a case like Acosta Orellana means that a potentially dangerous 
pesticide will continue to be used.  That is because the case that 
could have exposed its danger to the immediate plaintiffs and an un-
told number of consumers will never be litigated.  And going for-
ward, CropLife’s conduct will continue to be unregulated.  More 
broadly, product liability cases—cases that will often be brought by a 
vanishing plaintiff—are more difficult to bring.  The pertinent in-
formation about the product is largely in the hands of the defendant, 
and with premature dismissal under a restrictive pleading regime, the 
plaintiff will not have the ability to find information through discov-
ery.  Again, the regulatory effect is felt not just by the injured vanish-
ing plaintiff, but also by the untold number of future victims.  As dis-
cussed in Part III.C, when vanishing plaintiffs can no longer bring 
cases like Young and Acosta Orellana, the plaintiffs certainly lose, but 
so does society.  When policymakers consider restrictive procedural 
changes, it is this loss that must be weighed more accurately against 
the benefit of less frivolous litigation.
167
   
 
 167 Contrary to these cases, in a sample case with similar facts that was decided well 
before Twombly and Iqbal, the motion to dismiss was denied.  In 1993, the plaintiffs in 
Doucet v. Wadja brought a § 1983 action against the City of Westwego and some indi-
vidual police officers.  No. 92–4058, 1993 WL 92527, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 1993).  
The plaintiffs alleged that while attending a family wedding, the police officers hired 
as security for the event used excessive force against them.  Id. at *2.  This alleged 
force included beating a paraplegic man, pointing a gun at a woman and her young 
child, and assaulting a senior member of the family.  Id.  Notably, the plaintiffs also 
alleged that the officers’ conduct was a consequence of the City of Westwego’s failure 
to train the officers.  Id. at *3.  Like the plaintiffs in Young, the Doucet plaintiffs al-
leged that the municipality had “a custom, policy, practice and procedure of negli-
gently and inadequately hiring, training, supervising and retaining police officers 
with histories of police brutality” and that “the city condoned, ratified, approved or 
otherwise acquiesced in the actions of its officers.”  Id.  The court in Doucet noted 
that under Rule 8’s notice pleading requirements, this allegation was sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  Id.  (acknowledging the then-recent case of Leatherman 
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 169 (1993), 
where the Court struck down the Fifth Circuit precedent of requiring heightened 
pleading for claims against municipalities).  Whether Leatherman has survived 
Twombly and Iqbal is a controversial question that cannot be answered with any cer-
tainty.  In Doucet, the plaintiffs—individuals of little means represented by a sole 
practitioner—were able see their case through the pleading stage and thus were able 
to regulate the behavior and conduct of the Westwego police officers and city gov-
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B. Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is often explained as a paper trial—a term 
that insinuates a less-than-robust test of the merits of a plaintiff’s 
case.
168
  Many scholars have challenged summary judgment.  They ad-
vocate for a jury trial, or even a bench trial, where witnesses testify in 
person and evidence is presented in a “live” setting.
169
  Some scholars 
have even gone so far as to argue that summary judgment, as applied, 
is unconstitutional because it takes away one’s right to a jury trial.
170
  
At the crux of these critiques, however, is not an argument that sum-
mary judgment is a bad procedural mechanism that ought to be 
completely jettisoned.  Quite the contrary, most procedural scholars 
would probably agree that there is a time and a place for summary 
judgment—specifically, where the facts are settled and the only thing 
at issue is the law.
171
  It is the application of the standard that so many 
scholars find unsettling.  Generally speaking, many commentators be-
lieve that judges make factual determinations in deciding motions for 
summary judgment even when those factual determinations are the 
province of the jury.
172
 
The ascendance of summary judgment as a procedural tool be-
gan in 1986 when the Supreme Court decided its “trilogy” of sum-
 
ernment.  (The Doucets were represented by Douglas M. Schmidt of Douglas M. 
Schmidt, APLC.)   
 168 See Miller, supra note 25, at 1062–73.  In the section of his article discussing the 
use of summary judgment as a paper trial, Miller states, “Overly enthusiastic use of 
summary judgment means that trialworthy cases will be terminated pretrial on mo-
tion papers, possibly compromising the litigants’ constitutional rights to a day in 
court and jury trial.”  Id. at 1071. 
 169 See, e.g., id. at 984; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s 
Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (criticizing the court for its trilogy of cases).  
 170 See e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 
139 (2007).   
 171 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 25, at 1021, 1041–44 (relying on the fact that 
Charles Clark, a member of the original Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, supported the use of summary judgment, but only in cases “in which 
the material facts were not contested by either party,” to argue that current summary 
judgment practice is out of line with that original conception); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Taking Cognitive Iliberalism Seriously:  Judicial Humility, Aggregate Efficiency, and Justice, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 636 (2012) (arguing that where facts are subject to different 
interpretations, and are therefore in dispute, summary judgment is not an appropri-
ate mechanism for disposing of cases).    
 172 This is a bit of an over-generalization of the criticism levied at summary judg-
ment, as there are more nuanced arguments to be made.  But, many commentators, 
albeit in different terms, argue that judges make factual determinations in deciding 
summary judgment motions.  See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 170, at 143.   
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mary judgment cases.
173
  While each of these cases determined rather 
technical applications of summary judgment in three different sub-
stantive contexts,
174
 the cases collectively communicated that summary 
judgment was a tool to be used with greater frequency by trial 
courts.
175
  Courts responded to the trilogy by doing just that.  In one 
recent study of six federal districts, researchers found that the num-
ber of summary judgment motions granted in whole or in part dou-
bled between 1975 and 2000.
176
  That same study determined that al-
most eight percent of cases were terminated at the summary 
judgment stage in federal court in 2000, an increase from the four 
percent terminated in 1975.
177
  Moreover, a 2006 study of seventy-
eight federal districts determined that when summary judgment mo-
tions are brought, sixty percent are granted in whole or in part.
178
  In 
 
 173 Miller, supra note 25, at 984.  But see Stempel, supra note 169, at 160 (arguing 
that Rule 56 was used “frequently and often” even before the trilogy).   
 174 Matsushita determined that plaintiff’s evidence had to be of a particular quality 
to allow her to survive summary judgment.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1986).  Liberty Lobby held that the standard of proof 
at trial applied equally at the summary judgment stage.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986).  Finally, in Celotex, the Court determined that a moving 
party could carry its burden of production by pointing to the absence of evidence in 
the record.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).  The moving party 
did not need to present affirmative evidence where it did not bear the burden of 
proof at trial.  Id. at 323–25.  
 175 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote on behalf of the Court, “Summary judgment 
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as 
an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole.”  Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327; see also 
Miller, supra note 25, at 1041 (“On a practical level, the three decisions collectively 
forge a new, stronger role for the motion.”).   
 176 Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal 
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 883 (2007). 
 177 Id.  The study states that these changes, along with others in the study, were 
not “statistically significant.”  Id. at 862.  While this may be true as a statistical matter, 
the percentage of terminated cases undoubtedly increased.  In addition, studies of 
summary judgment activity cannot accurately assess the chilling effect of changes to 
summary judgment practice.  See Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We 
Think We Know Versus What We Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 707, 722 (2012); see 
also Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A Proposal for Procedural Reform 
in the Core Motion Context, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1661–62 (1995).  In this study, 
Sinclair and Hanes found that the percentage of summary judgment motions grant-
ed in federal court increased from fifty-four percent in 1955 to sixty-five percent in 
1993.  Sinclair & Hanes, supra, at 1660.   
 178 Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Mi-
chael Baylson for Estimates of Summary Judgment Activity in Fiscal Year 2006, at 2–3 
(2007) [Cecil & Cort Memorandum], available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf.  
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sum, summary judgment is a paradigmatic example of the shift from 
a liberal to restrictive ethos in procedural doctrine.
179
 
A restrictive application of summary judgment affects the vanish-
ing plaintiff differently from other plaintiffs because her narrative 
matters.  As noted in Part III.B, the vanishing plaintiff stands outside 
of dominant mainstream constructions of race, gender, sexuality, 
and/or culture.  Federal judges are inside that mainstream; thus, 
there is almost certainly a lack of “sameness” with the judge who is 
deciding her case.
180
  Instead of presenting her case to a jury in an 
open court, the vanishing plaintiff is relegated to a paper presenta-
tion of her argument, often without oral argument or an otherwise 
open forum, in front of a judge who has a much lower chance of 
finding some commonality with her than a jury of her peers might.  
This collision of a paper record, a single adjudicator, and the mar-
ginalized nature of the vanishing plaintiff cause her to be affected 
differently from other plaintiffs when summary judgment is applied 
restrictively. 
A recent case involving a vanishing plaintiff demonstrates this 
point.  This case was decided on summary judgment at the district 
court level.  In Creed v. Family Express Corp., the plaintiff, Amber 
Creed, was employed by a small convenience store chain in Indiana 
called Family Express.
181
  Creed is a transgender woman.
182
  When she 
interviewed for a position at Family Express, she presented herself as 
a man and called herself Christopher Creed.
183
  Over the course of 
the next few months, she began to feminize her appearance.
184
  Creed 
 
 179 See Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 56, at 75 (“[S]ummary judgment fun-
damentally alters the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants by raising 
both the costs and risks to plaintiffs in the pretrial phases of litigation while diminish-
ing both for defendants.”); Miller, supra note 25, at 1016–57; D. Michael Risinger, 
Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court’s New 
Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 37 (1988); Stempel, supra note 
169, at 160 (arguing that the trilogy of cases made summary judgment more pro-
defendants).  But see Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, In Summary It Makes Sense: A Proposal 
to Substantially Expand the Role of Summary Judgment in Nonjury Cases, 43 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 319 (2006) (arguing that summary judgment is a valid and efficient procedure). 
 180 See supra note 87.   
 181 No. 3:06-cv-465RM, 2009 WL 35237, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009). 
 182 Id.  I have modified the court’s language when it describes Creed because such 
language reflects a controversial approach to recognizing transgender individuals 
only when supported by medical authority.  For a critique of this approach, see Dean 
Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15 (2003).   
 183 Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *1. 
 184 Id. 
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identifies as female and, at work, she began to wear a feminine hair-
style, makeup, and nail polish.
185
 
Creed received exemplary employment evaluations from both 
her supervisors and customers.
186
  However, as her appearance 
changed more drastically, some customers allegedly began to com-
plain about Creed’s appearance.
187
  Around that time, her supervisors 
met with her and asked her to conform to the company’s dress code 
and grooming policy.
188
  That policy provided that all employees 
should “maintain a conservative, socially acceptable general appear-
ance.”
189
  This included a requirement that males “maintain neat and 
conservative hair that is above the collar” and prohibited “earrings” 
or “body piercing[s].” 
190
  Her supervisors told her that they had to 
enforce this policy, meaning that she could no longer present herself 
as a woman at work.
191
  When Creed explained that she was 
transgender, going through the process of gender transition, and 
thus had to present as a woman, her supervisor responded by asking 
her if “it would kill [her] to appear masculine for eight hours a 
day.”
192
  One supervisor also asked her why she had applied for the 
position when she knew she was going to start her gender transi-
tion.
193
  Ultimately, Creed’s supervisors presented her with an ultima-
tum—show up to work “as a man” or lose her job.
194
  Creed refused 
their demands and was terminated.
195
  Creed then filed a complaint in 
the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.
196
  The thrust 
of her complaint was that Family Express had discriminated against 
her on the basis of sex because it terminated her when “she failed to 
conform to stereotypes about how a man should appear.”
197
 
Without going too deeply into the substantive background of 
Creed’s claim, the germane issue in her case was whether she could 
 
 185 Id. at *3.   
 186 Id. at *2.   
 187 Id. at *3. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *2.   
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at *3. 
 192 Id. at *3, *4, *9. 
 193 Id. at *3.   
 194 Id.   
 195 Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *4.   
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at *7.  Creed brought claims under Title VII and under Indiana’s Civil 
Rights Act.  Id.   
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present evidence that “she wouldn’t have been terminated but for 
her failure to conform to male stereotypes.”
198
  To support her argu-
ment, Creed pointed to the discussions she had with her supervisors 
in which she was told to come to work “as a man,” asked if “it would 
kill her” to come to work as a man, and interrogated as to why she 
applied for the job knowing she was going to seek gender transi-
tion.
199
  She also presented deposition testimony from one of her su-
pervisors in which he admitted that he thought Creed looked differ-
ent because of her “feminine appearance” and in which he stated 
that he did not “consider wearing makeup or having long hair to be 
masculine characteristics.”
200
  Moreover, Creed argued that the timing 
of her termination was suspect.
201
  Family Express had alleged that it 
received numerous complaints about Creed; yet, she did not learn 
about them until the day of her meeting with the supervisors (the day 
she was terminated).
202
  She argued that this showed discriminatory 
animus because she was terminated on the heels of her supervisors 
starting to notice her physical changes.
203
  Finally, she argued that the 
customer complaints and grooming policy were pretext for discrimi-
nation.
204
  She specifically pointed to Family Express’s inability to 
produce any copies of the alleged customer complaints.
205
  Family 
Express countered with evidence, by way of its supervisors’ deposition 
testimony, that it terminated Creed because she did not conform to 
its dress code and grooming policy, and not because she was not 
“male enough.”
206
 
The court entered summary judgment in favor of Family Ex-
press.
207
  It found that “[t]he totality of Ms. Creed’s evidence creates 
 
 198 Id. at *8.   
 199 Id. at *3, *4, *9.   
 200 Id. at *9.  
 201 Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *9. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at *10. 
 205 Id.  Family Express claimed that the complaints logged over the internet were 
deleted and that one of its supervisors could not find the notes he took to document 
the telephone complaints he received.  Id.  The court found no evidence of bad faith 
on the part of Family Express in failing to produce this evidence.  Id.  Moreover, the 
court found that the customer complaints did not motivate Creed’s termination—
her failure to comply with the grooming policy did.  Id.   
 206 Id. at *9–10.   
 207 Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *9–10. 
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no genuine issue of material fact that Family Express terminated her 
based on her gender.”
208
  Here is a vanishing plaintiff. 
In Creed’s case, her identity and substantive claims were firmly 
outside dominant mainstream culture’s awareness of what constitutes 
gender and gender discrimination.
209
  To begin with, the substantive 
claim itself was innovative.  There is a split of authority regarding 
whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender indi-
viduals based on sexual stereotyping, so Creed had an incredible sub-
stantive hurdle to overcome.
210
  Even when the judge applied a gen-
erous construction of the substantive law, however, Creed’s claim 
failed on summary judgment.
211
  In the eyes of this particular judge, 
there was no genuine issue of material fact about why Family Express 
terminated Creed.  In the judge’s mind, the business terminated her 
because she did not conform to the company’s dress code and 
grooming policy.
212
  Yet, when reading this case, it seems highly prob-
able that reasonable jurors might disagree with the judge’s conclu-
sion.  The evidence presented—statements made to Creed by her su-
pervisors, the timing of her termination, and the supervisors’ 
deposition statements—may have led a jury to an impression that 
 
 208 Id. at *10. 
 209 For more information about transgender individuals, see generally AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, 
GENDER IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION (2011), available at 
http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/transgender.pdf. 
 210 Under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), an individual can state 
a Title VII claim if she alleges that she was discriminated against because she failed to 
conform to sex stereotypes.  However, some courts have rejected the application of 
Price Waterhouse to transgender individuals altogether.  See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Auth., No. 2:04CV616, 2005 WL 1505610, at *5 (D. Utah June 24, 2005) (“There is a 
huge difference between a woman who does not behave as femininely as her em-
ployer thinks she should, and a man who is attempting to change his sex and ap-
pearance to be a woman.  Such drastic action cannot be fairly characterized as a 
mere failure to conform to stereotypes.”); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt Servs., Inc., 
857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) (rejecting the application of Title VII to claims of 
discrimination by transgender individuals); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 850 F. 
Supp. 284, 286–87 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same).  But see Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 
566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-
conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of 
that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim 
where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-
conformity.”); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying 
Price Waterhouse to discrimination case by transgender individual); Rosa v. Park West 
Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); Mitchell v. Axcan 
Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 
2006) (same).   
 211 Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *11. 
 212 Id. at *9. 
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there was an issue of fact regarding what motivated her termination.  
That issue of fact would have been best resolved by observing the wit-
nesses and hearing all of the evidence.  However, on summary judg-
ment, no testimony is heard and the evidence is presented piecemeal.  
In this case, such a presentation led the judge to determine that there 
was no issue of fact for the jury to decide.
213
 
The judge’s bias, if any, in this case cannot be known.  However, 
it is possible that this claim was just not tenable to the judge—it was 
outside of the judge’s (and much of society’s) dominant views of 
gender.  Thus, for the judge, it was easier to explain the defendant’s 
behavior by pointing to an accepted grooming and dress code policy 
than it would be to delve more deeply into gender stereotypes.  This 
is not to say that this judge did not understand the substantive claim 
or that the judge was not sensitive to the issues in this case.  However, 
this claim undoubtedly pushes the boundaries of one’s understand-
ing of gender in a way that is difficult for many people, including 
judges, to accept.
214
  It is when these boundaries are pushed that a 
vanishing plaintiff benefits from presenting her narrative before a ju-
ry in open court.  Or put another way, it is at these boundaries where 
a vanishing plaintiff is distinctly disadvantaged by a restrictive applica-
tion of summary judgment—where her claim is resolved by one adju-
dicator on a paper record. 
Even assuming that the analysis so far is true, one could argue 
that all plaintiffs will be equally impacted by these observations in the 
context of summary judgment.  In most cases, the plaintiff will have a 
different normative view than the judge reviewing her case—
whenever the plaintiff loses, she could say that the judge does not 
agree with her worldview.  In other words, summary judgment will 
impact all plaintiffs equally.  This is not the case. 
For instance, most discrimination claims require a fact-finder to 
weigh what a reasonable person would experience as discriminatory 
conduct.
215
  With summary judgment, a judge can determine what a 
 
 213 Id. at *11. 
 214 In my search for cases, I did the following search in Westlaw’s federal district 
court published and unpublished opinion database: “Summary Judgment” /s Grant! 
& Transgender! & discriminat!.  The search resulted in forty-eight cases.  Forty-one 
of those were inapposite either because they were prisoner civil rights cases (ten) or 
because they did not deal with transgender individuals alleging employment discrim-
ination (thirty-one cases).  Of the remaining seven cases, the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment was granted (including Creed’s case), and in one case the de-
fendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied in part and granted in part.   
 215 See Saxton v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co, 10 F. 3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Whether 
the plaintiff’s work environment meets that standard is determined from the view-
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reasonable person might believe as a matter of law, when, by all ac-
counts, this is a factually intensive question upon which reasonable—
for lack of a better term—people could disagree.  As Professor Eliza-
beth Schneider explains, “[W]hat if the judge does not realize the 
differences between those views—his or her perspective and those of 
a ‘reasonable juror’?  What if a judge does not have the humility, self-
awareness, or insight to recognize the limitations of his or her own 
perspective?”
216
  As already discussed, judges may make determina-
tions or value judgments about what a reasonable person might per-
ceive and that determination may vary greatly from that of a jury’s.
217
  
On summary judgment, a judge may perceive the facts from a norma-
tive viewpoint that is different from the plaintiff’s’ and may separate 
out facts, thereby frustrating a holistic view of what a plaintiff might 
be experiencing.
218
  As a consequence, that judge may be deciding a 
motion for summary judgment in a way that is different from how he 
or a jury might adjudicate the same set of facts following trial.
219
  In 
this way, the vanishing plaintiff is impacted differently than other 
plaintiffs. 
However, even accepting that this depiction of a vanishing plain-
tiff is true, there is another question to answer: Why should society 
care?  There are a few reasons.  For one, summary judgment matters.  
Given the number of cases that actually go to trial in our federal civil 
justice system, it is more accurate to say that litigation functions in the 
shadow of the summary judgment motion than in the shadow of a tri-
al.  When summary judgment is granted in favor of a defendant, it 
generally ends the case.
220
  In contrast, when a defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment is denied, defendants generally offer to settle on 
 
point of a reasonable employee.”); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environ-
ments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 315 (1999).   
 216 See Schneider, supra note 85, at 766–67.  Schneider discusses Gallagher v. 
Delaney, where Judge Weinstein emphasized the need in sexual harassment cases for 
factual assessment by a “jury made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous com-
munities” instead of “a federal judge [who] usually lives in a narrow segment of the 
enormously broad American socioeconomic spectrum, generally lacking the current 
real-life experience required to interpret subtle dynamics of the workplace based on 
nuances, subtle perceptions, and implicit communications.”  139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d 
Cir. 1998).   
 217 See discussion supra Part III.B.  
 218 For a suggested set of summary judgment “safeguards” that may mitigate these 
effects, see Edward Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1165 
(2010). 
 219 For empirical analysis of this phenomenon in a recent controversial Supreme 
Court case Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), see Kahan et al., supra note 90. 
 220 Unless, of course, the plaintiff decides to appeal and then wins on appeal, but 
appeals are both costly and risky propositions.  
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considerably more generous terms than they would have pre-
motion.
221
 
This outcome effect is especially acute in the civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination context where summary judgment motions 
are granted with greater frequency than in other substantive areas.  A 
2006 study of summary judgment cases in federal courts found that in 
civil rights cases, seventy percent of defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment were granted, and in employment discrimination cases, 
seventy-three percent of defendants’ motions for summary judgment 
were granted.
222
  This means that for a large number of these kinds of 
cases, they are over well before they have a chance to be argued to a 
jury.  This is often fatal because, as at least one study has indicated, 
jury trials are the only way for a plaintiff, who has not otherwise set-
tled, to win her case.
223
  For example, in a study conducted by Profes-
sor Wendy Parker, in the 656 cases she studied, 421 were resolved on 
the merits by the court, which means that the other 235 cases set-
tled.
224
  Of those 421 cases, the plaintiffs won only six cases, and all six 
of those cases were tried before a jury.
225
 
And, as discussed in Part III.C, the social benefit of vanishing 
plaintiffs’ claims matter because of the path-breaking and regulatory 
benefits.  Thus, in Creed’s case, what does society lose when her 
claim is prematurely terminated?  Namely, society loses the ability to 
regulate Family Express’s behavior.  Because Creed’s case was not 
permitted to reach the trial to be fully and publicly adjudicated, em-
ployers like Family Express can more easily discriminate against 
transgender individuals.  More broadly, if all vanishing plaintiffs’ 
claims are sifted out through a restrictive procedural regime, discrim-
ination laws will remain largely unenforced.  These laws rely on a pri-
vate right of action; therefore, to eliminate the kind of innovative 
claims brought by vanishing plaintiffs on procedural grounds is to 
render these laws unenforced.
226
 
 
 221 See Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 56, at 99–100.   
 222 Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 178, at 6.  For contracts cases, the rate 
was fifty-three percent; for tort cases, the rate was fifty-four percent; for prisoner cas-
es, the rate was sixty-four percent; and for “other” cases, the rate was fifty-three per-
cent.  Id. at 6–7.   
 223 Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 889, 894 (2006). 
 224 Id. at 941. 
 225 Id.  
 226 As a counter to these cases, in a sample case with similar facts that was decided 
right before the summary judgment trilogy, the motion for summary judgment was 
denied.  In 1984, a female Federal Highway Administration employee, Judy Carol 
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Getting a case before a jury does not mean that the plaintiff will 
win, nor does it mean that the summary judgment motions were 
wrongly decided.  It could be that even a jury of one’s peers would ul-
timately decide that plaintiff’s claim is not a winning claim.  The 
point is that when such a high number of summary judgment mo-
tions are granted by virtue of a restrictive approach to procedural 
doctrine, it must be assumed that some of those claims are meritori-
ous.  Knowing that some of those meritorious claims are brought by 
vanishing plaintiffs should lead those responsible for crafting proce-
dural doctrines to consider what advantages might be gained from 
keeping those claims in the system.  Stated another way, when con-
sidering whether to move to a restrictive procedural system, one 
should ask what might be lost systemically if vanishing plaintiff claims 
are differently impacted by such a move.
227
 
 
Holland brought an employment discrimination action in a case called Holland v. 
Dole,  591 F. Supp. 983 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).  Holland alleged that while she had been 
trained and groomed for a promotion for over three years, she was ultimately denied 
that position because, as she alleged, her immediate supervisor did not want a wom-
an in the position.  Id. at 988.  The defendant moved for summary judgment in the 
case, providing evidence that the position Holland sought had been moved to a dif-
ferent geographic location; thus, Holland had not been hired simply because she was 
unwilling to relocate.  Id. at 989.  The defendant further argued that it did not dis-
criminate against Holland based on her gender because it ultimately hired a female 
candidate for the position.  Id. at 989–90.  In spite of this evidence, the judge denied 
the motion for summary judgment, stating that “the credibility of the defendants’ 
agents’ assertions must be judged at trial.”  Id. at 990.   
 227 In addition to the restrictive procedural changes that are highlighted in this 
Part, there are others.  For example, Rule 11 sanctions and the CAFA.    As discussed 
earlier, supra note 27, Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to require sanctions for “frivo-
lous” filings.  That amendment was softened in 1993 to give judges discretion to sanc-
tion parties and their lawyers, but many commentators have noted that, even under 
the revised rule, there is still a chilling effect on plaintiffs.  See supra note 27 supra.  
For example, the FJC recently conducted a survey of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ at-
torneys in which the FJC solicited feedback about the federal civil justice system as a 
whole and about specific procedural rules.  WILLGING & LEE III, supra note 73.  One 
plaintiff’s attorney stated the following about current Rule 11 and why his small firm 
did not take on a particularly innovative claim, “Fortune 500 companies can afford to 
absorb Rule 11 sanctions but our firm and our clients cannot.  That’s an imbalance.”  
Id. at 36.  The claims that I discussed in the previous Part—vicarious liability claims 
against a trade association of pesticide manufactures or a sexual discrimination suit 
by a transgender individual—are claims that are innovative.  As the lawyer in the sur-
vey above noted, these kinds of claims are often made in good faith, but it is difficult 
for small firms or solo practitioners to take on the risk associated with them when 
sanctions are threatened.  The risk that a judge may find that the claim is not innova-
tive, but instead is not supported by the law, is just too great for many practitioners.  
Yet, the solo practitioner or small firm is exactly the place where the vanishing plain-
tiff will seek counsel.  See discussion supra Part III.A.  In this way, the restrictive ap-
proach to sanctions disparately impacts the vanishing plaintiff.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
A more liberal procedural regime fosters many social goods.  
Thus, the institutions responsible for procedural doctrine—the 
Court, Congress, and rulemaking bodies—should be mindful of how 
restrictive changes to the procedural regime affect the vanishing 
plaintiff.  It may not be the case that a return to the pure ideals of the 
liberal ethos is achievable or even attractive.  If the civil justice system 
is so burdened that it cannot efficiently adjudicate claims, this is not a 
good result for any litigant, especially the vanishing plaintiff.  Yet, 
when constructing procedural rules, these institutions should be 
mindful of and weigh the impact of their decisions on vanishing 
plaintiffs.  In other words, when these institutions are at the tension 
point of deciding whether the loss of some meritorious claims is a 
worthy sacrifice, they should consider whose meritorious claims these 
are.  If the sacrificed claims are the vanishing plaintiffs’, that factor 
should be heavily weighed when considering that particular proce-
dural change.  As shown in this Article, the civil justice system and so-
ciety have much to gain from vanishing plaintiffs’ claims, and these 
gains should not be undervalued. 
Thus, at the very least, these institutions must consider the van-
ishing plaintiff and whether a restrictive change to procedure affects 
her.  This must be done on a case-by-case basis, however.  There are 
some procedural changes that may not impact the vanishing plaintiff 
at all.
228
  However, when deciding the inevitable case challenging Iqbal 
 
     Another restrictive change to procedural doctrine is CAFA.  As already discussed, 
the Act essentially confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over all class actions 
seeking damages in excess of $5 million.  According to commentators, Congress 
passed this legislation at the behest of “business and manufacturers’ groups.”  See, 
e.g., Cabraser, note 28, at 448.  While class actions are certainly not a plaintiff’s pana-
cea, they are a useful procedure for plaintiffs’ attorneys because they allow the attor-
ney to consolidate claims, thus exceeding that magic $1 million filing benchmark.  
Id. at 440.  Class actions are useful for individual plaintiffs as well because they incen-
tivize plaintiffs who would not otherwise seek recourse on their own to pursue their 
legal claims collectively.  Id.  Yet, CAFA has affected the ability of individuals to seek 
redress through class actions.  Id. at 448.  This is because almost all class actions are 
now effectively federal court matters, and federal courts are less likely to certify class 
actions.  Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 7, at 363.  Thus, CAFA is like the restrictive 
procedural changes already discussed.  Vanishing plaintiffs often benefit from class 
actions because the procedure allows individual plaintiffs with smaller claims to find 
a well-qualified lawyer to take their case.  Moreover, class actions are often innovative 
claims, and in this way, some vanishing plaintiffs suffer from the inability to use the 
procedure.  Finally, class actions often serve a private regulatory function.  The de-
crease in class actions thus impacts both the vanishing plaintiff’s ability to seek re-
dress and society’s ability to benefit from that litigation. 
 228 Ministerial or technical changes, for example, should not require policymakers 
to consider the vanishing plaintiff.   
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and its plausibility pleading standards, the Court should consider 
both the benefits of plausibility pleading (protection of defendants 
from frivolous claims) as well as the costs (the effect of such a plead-
ing requirement on the vanishing plaintiff).  Only when the vanish-
ing plaintiff is considered can a truly fair and neutral procedural re-
gime be constructed. 
This means that we need to know more about the vanishing 
plaintiff.  This Article is just the beginning of determining how to en-
sure that her claims are not lost.  It gives this plaintiff a name and 
demonstrates her import to our civil justice system and society.  But 
there is a need for a fuller picture of who she is.  Empirical work will 
be required to determine how particular procedural changes affect 
the vanishing plaintiff differently from other plaintiffs.  This kind of 
study should happen at the rulemaking level—the committees should 
endeavor to understand the impact of rule changes before making 
them.  Moreover, the Court and Congress should do the same.  But 
such analysis should also happen in the scholarly discourse.  There is 
a dearth of work that explains and understands the true nature of 
how plaintiffs are affected by procedural doctrine.  A more robust 
understanding and description of the vanishing plaintiff would go a 
long way toward helping create a better procedural regime. 
 
